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ABSTRACT 
 
Commercial human spaceflight looks ready to take off as an industry, with ―space tourism‖ as its 
first application.  Paying passengers are likely to begin taking suborbital spaceflights within the 
next several years, both despite and because of the risks and hazards inherent in human 
spaceflight.  As this activity poses dangers to passengers, there will be an increasing degree of 
government regulation and oversight to protect participant safety.  Though human spaceflight is 
not a new endeavour, commercial human spaceflight poses a new set of challenges for regulators 
to grapple with.  As is the case with many emerging technological industries, the regulatory 
challenge is to protect the safety of both participants and the uninvolved without regulating to a 
degree that stifles industry innovation and growth.  This thesis examines the history and 
regulation of commercial human spaceflight to date.  The technical background, systems 
engineering, and risk management of human spaceflight are explored, to determine which 
particular subsystem-mission phase combinations warrant closer regulatory attention.  Finally, 
this paper gives recommendations on how future regulation of this nascent industry ought to be 
approached by the federal government and its regulatory agencies. 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Dramatization 
 
 The sun rises over the flat New Mexico horizon and the first rays of morning shorten the 
shadows below.  From a birds-eye view, there is a bright glint from the ground as light reflects 
off of the gleaming hull of the craft emerging from the hangar. 
  
 The vehicle heading towards the long runway stretching out into the desert is really two 
flying machines held together, each designed and suited for a specific purpose.  The larger 
machine on top appears to be cradling the smaller, blunter vehicle below its wing as if to protect 
it before releasing its companion to embark on its own flight. 
 
 The serene scene reflected in the windows of the buildings that the craft taxis past is, as is 
not unusual in this stage of the mission, unreflective of the more nervously raucous chatter 
echoing within the double-paned walls of the smaller vehicle.  ―Don‘t worry ‗bout a thing, 
darlin‘,‖ says the gregarious ex-Navy woman to the increasingly pale and sweating young 
cinema heartthrob, ―the waiting‘s the worst part!‖ 
 
 ―Man, I don‘t know about you guys, but I am so excited to take off!  This is it!‖ exclaims 
the successful software developer to the rather reserved Russian businessman, as he glances 
behind to his other two co-passengers and bounces to a boil excitedly beneath his safety harness.  
As the dual vehicle reaches the start of the runway and glides to a pause, the four soon-to-be 
astronauts hear the pilot up front running through final checklists in preparation for takeoff. 
 
 With a cheery warning from the pilot to the passengers, the aircraft and spacecraft 
together quickly begin accelerating down the runway, picking up speed with each passing 
moment.  Within a few seconds, the passengers all feel the familiar gentle lurch of the stomach 
as the system takes off and begins leaving the ground behind.  The passengers gaze out the 
windows in rapt attention to judge how high they are climbing. 
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 At an altitude above those reached by commercial jets, and already above the thickest 
parts of the atmosphere, the passengers are notified shortly before their smaller craft detaches 
from its carrier and begins to freefall.  The pleasant, light sensation of the drop is replaced within 
a few seconds with the bone-jarring, tooth-rattling kick of energy that jerks through the vehicle 
as the rockets ignite and the craft takes a decidedly more vertical trajectory.  This jolting feeling 
is surprisingly more energetic than expected to even the two passengers who had participated in 
the recommended training camp prior to flight. 
 
 The numbers on the digital altitude display increase rapidly and the passengers are tightly 
pressed into their seats by the acceleration.  The former sailor manages a muffled whoop as the 
craft reaches Mach 1 and powers through the sonic boom on its way to a sky that is blacker than 
any that the passengers had ever seen.  Then, as abruptly as it began, the rocket cuts out and the 
spacecraft soon begins a lazy drift over the top of its suborbital trajectory arc. 
 
 As soon as the pilot indicates that the passengers are ―free to move about the cabin,‖ each 
in turn unbuckles themselves from his or her seat and gleefully begins to fly and flip within the 
enclosed and protected space.  The businessman, dubbed the mission‘s ―assistant commander‖ 
by the pilot thanks to the premium he had negotiated to pay for the honor, reaches into his jacket 
pocket to pull out and open a small bag of specially-commissioned M&Ms, and the passengers 
delight in hunting them down with their mouths wide open as they float about the cabin.  Even 
the young actor, inwardly terrified through the first stages of the flight, and initially even 
reluctant to leave his seat once it was permitted, smiles as he captures a renegade chocolate that 
he spies floating by his face. 
 
 Though they feel as though they could float and gaze out the windows at the curvature of 
the Earth and its thin band of blue atmosphere forever, the few minutes quickly pass and the pilot 
announces that it is time to return to their seats for reentry and landing.  The computer 
programmer, having waited his entire life for this moment since dreaming of exploring space like 
his childhood heroes, is reluctant to be ripped from his gripping view at the main observation 
window to return to his seat.  Not until a stern call from the pilot and a sincere plea from the 
―assistant commander‖ does he resignedly turn to float back to his seat. 
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 Suddenly, the lights in the cabin go black and the whirring noises of the subsystems 
around them begin to fade.  The passengers are confused as a red warning light begins to flash, 
and the software developer struggles to get strapped back into his seat amid the discord.  This is 
nothing that they had anticipated, or which had been suggested in the promotional videos.  The 
pilot quickly counsels the passengers to stay calm, but his words do little to soothe their worries 
as the cabin temperature begins to increase and a faint acrid smell hits their nostrils.  Though the 
ex-sailor has been in tighter jams before, she begins to wonder if this spaceflight operator was 
the right choice as descent continues: chaotic, and clearly not nominal. 
 
1.2 Background 
 
A safety-threatening event such as just described, despite the best efforts of commercial 
human spaceflight (CHS) companies, may come to pass in one of a million different ways.  It is 
not morbid or pessimistic to consider the potential failings of a new and exciting, if unproven, 
industry.  Imagining the worst-case scenarios is a necessity if CHS is to succeed. 
 
Human spaceflight (HS) has, since its inception, largely been the province of national 
governments.  Only well-funded and large-scale programs, sponsored thus far by the United 
States (US), Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)/Russia, and China, could possibly meet 
the technical, economic, political, and regulatory challenges of sending human beings into space.  
Spurred primarily by geopolitical considerations of national prestige through impressive 
technological accomplishments, the competing government space exploration programs of the 
US and USSR engaged in a ―space race‖ through the 1960s, with the Apollo moon landings as 
the pinnacle of accomplishment. 
 
 Since that time, the three spacefaring nations and their international partners have not 
ventured past low Earth orbit, focusing instead on space stations, international cooperative 
projects, and use of the Space Shuttle and Soyuz to access space.  While there have been major 
accomplishments in this era, public interest and support has waned significantly since Apollo.  
Current public disenchantment with government-led HS in the US can be traced to several 
factors, including 1) a remade geopolitical paradigm after the fall of the Soviet Union, 2) 
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budgetary challenges stemming from fluctuating economies and entitlement programs leaving 
less funding available for discretionary government spending, and 3) catastrophic accidents that 
have resulted in loss of life, drained resources, and suspended HS for years at a time. 
 
The US government HS program has suffered from lack of direction and purpose, and 
currently fails to excite the average American.  The National Aeronautics and Space 
Administration (NASA) is not a defective organization, but it has for decades felt the frustration 
of being too important for the government to give up altogether, while not prioritized highly 
enough to be allocated the resources necessary to do work that excites the nation.  For the 
children who grew up watching men land on the moon, the present lack of Martian colonies 
represents a failure of NASA to realize their future technological and exploration fantasies. 
 
CHS, in its initial application of ―space tourism,‖ is hoping to fill the excitement gap.  
The dream of comparatively more affordable, regular, personal access to space has been a long-
awaited step in the progress of HS, and it is nearing possibility due to the efforts of a few 
enterprising companies with wealthy and patient benefactors.  The suborbital flights soon to be 
offered are somewhat short of the once-promised Pan Am journey to the moon
1
, but these efforts 
could represent the beginning of a new era in HS. 
 
 While HS has been happening since 1961, CHS is a new industry because of its unique 
characteristics.  CHS brings a set of several smaller-scale actors to the scene compared with 
government HS programs.  These companies have smaller budgets, smaller workforces, less 
diverse mission portfolios, and much less direct government oversight that do the government-
run programs.  The fundamental goal of a CHS company is to eventually turn a profit, rather than 
to seek geopolitical prestige or further planetary exploration and space science, and funding 
sources are different, with accountability to investors rather than to national governments. 
 
 This enterprise faces myriad technical challenges, with mission and life safety as critical 
to success as the economic efficiency required to be commercially sustainable.  The required 
                                                 
1
 da Silva, W. (2006, December). Children of Apollo. Retrieved July 22, 2008, from Cosmos Magazine: 
http://www.cosmosmagazine.com/features/print/1163/children-apollo 
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seamless integration of subsystems over all phases of flight is no simple task.  There are many 
things that can go wrong, between the 1) explosive energies required to reach space, the 2) 
unforgiving harshness of the space environment, and the 3) history of tragic accidents occurring 
even under careful control of the best personnel.  Given the potentially disastrous consequences 
of these hazards, some sort of government safety regulation was inevitable. 
 
For CHS, the regulatory framework is already being built before the operational 
beginning of the industry.  This is especially true as compared with other high-risk recreational 
activities which are generally not regulated until government regulatory bodies become aware of 
their existence following their grass-roots evolutions.  Because of CHS‘s prominent place in the 
public eye as compared to most new industries, and potential for significant damage to the 
uninvolved public if a mission should go awry, government regulation and oversight began 
relatively early.  The long start-up time between public announcements of CHS companies and 
their maiden commercial voyages has provided plenty of time for governments to craft 
regulation and oversight policies that seek to prevent accidents. 
 
The way that the US government will approach regulation protecting the safety of 
passengers in the long run is still being determined.  Congress last passed related legislation in 
2004, with the idea that CHS might be up and running as an industry by as early as 2006.  This 
legislation delayed issuing design or operations rules protecting passenger safety in order to give 
the industry time to innovate and experiment with different concepts of operation.  This way, 
best practices could emerge before setting on rules that could lock in certain design and 
operational features.  As of 2008, the industry looks poised to not have its inaugural flights until 
perhaps 2010.  CHS companies would like to avoid stricter regulation as long as possible, while 
other interested parties think it is already long overdue. 
 
1.3 Problem statement 
 
How to regulate CHS to protect passenger safety is a question that still has no definite 
answer.  There is a scarcity of data available to regulators at present, which limits the ability to 
predict future trends.  This thesis will synthesize an approach with an examination of risk and 
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regulatory theory, history of HS, CHS, and relatable industries such as ―adventure sports‖, and 
specific technical aspects of CHS that can be targeted for closer oversight.  This will allow us to 
craft recommendations to policy-makers about passenger safety regulation in CHS.  It is the 
conclusion of this thesis that federal regulators can best assure maximum welfare for the industry 
and public by regulating design and operations in a fashion that targets only the most critical 
mission phase-subsystem combinations, and avoiding making across-the-board rules until there 
are enough viable companies operating to make generalizations efficient and meaningful. 
 
1.4 Roadmap 
 
 This thesis will address this problem by building upon the work of other scholars and 
deploying original analysis to add value to the discussion.  After this introduction in Chapter 1, 
Chapter 2 will delve into the theoretical background of both government regulation and risk and 
safety literature.  This will set the theoretical stage for a discussion of regulation by government 
of risk and safety in CHS.  Chapter 2 also posits adventure sports as an analogy to CHS. 
 
Chapter 3 will further the discussion with a detailed history of CHS from its origins to the 
present.  It begins with a review of the history of commercial aviation and its regulatory system 
and is followed by the history of commercial space (CS) leading to CHS.  
 
 Chapter 4 gives a risk and safety background of CHS so that the regulatory regimes 
discussed can be technically informed and relevant.  Included in this chapter are precise 
definitions that we will use with regards to CHS and space, different approaches to design, and 
cross analysis of mission phases and critical subsystems.  Actual relevant incidents and accidents 
in the history of HS are examined to identify where risk and safety is most critical. 
 
 Chapter 5 concludes the entire discussion with a concise summary of the previous 
chapters and several conclusions.  Recommendations are then given as to how regulation of 
passenger safety in CHS might proceed in a way that will ensure safety while not stifling 
innovation among entrepreneurial companies.  
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CHAPTER 2: REGULATION AND RISK BACKGROUND 
 
There is at once a rich and lacking body of literature available upon which to build this 
research.  Government safety regulation of CHS is very new, and there is little available 
academically about government safety regulation of existing high-risk recreational activities.  
However, there abound volumes of scholarly literature about government regulation, risk, and 
safety.  In this body of work we will find that targeted government regulation of risk and safety 
is best for small, emerging industries.  The optimal method is for Congress to delegate authority 
to independent agencies to both assess and manage risk without contaminating the two 
responsibilities with one another or becoming controlled by the regulated industries. 
 
The related theoretical work will illuminate potential approaches to a new problem.  We 
will begin by examining government regulation theory and use of expert agencies.  Following 
that, we will look at market failures and regulatory justifications.  Next will be types of 
regulation, rule-making strategies, and regulatory consequences.  Then we will discuss 
regulatory capture and self-regulation. 
 
Next, we will examine literature about risk and safety.  Beginning with a discussion of 
risk at the individual level, we will compare and contrast risk issues in theory, government, and 
adventure.  We will then explore risk perception, risk assessment, risk communication, risk 
acceptance, informed consent, uncertainty, and risk management. 
 
We will then look at the specific subsets of technological risk and disaster theory, 
followed lastly by an exploration of adventure sports as an analogy for CHS.  Through the course 
of this literature review, we will discover where the gaps in the body of knowledge are that we 
may help to fill with this research.  
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2.1 Government regulation 
 
2.1.1 Regulation theory and background 
 
We will begin with an exploration of how and why governments regulate in the first 
place as a ―normal activity of government in an industrialized, urbanized society‖ (Bernstein, 
1955).  This thesis focuses specifically on US government passenger safety regulation for CHS.  
The US‘s regulatory system provides a rich field of study, having ―virtually invented the modern 
regulatory state‖ (Moran, 2002).  The power of government to enact any sort of regulation is 
based on Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the United States Constitution, which states, ―The 
Congress shall have power . . . To regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the 
several states, and with the Indian tribes.‖  From this ―Interstate Commerce Clause‖, Congress 
derives its power to enact a broad range of regulation, since nearly every modern industry has 
some interstate aspect. 
 
The US government, through Congress and the power it delegates, has an enormous 
impact on industry, able to help or hurt a large number of industries (Stigler, 1971).  Congress 
utilizes this power over most industries, trying in theory to protect the public good.  While 
Congress has broad power, it is limited in the amount of detailed oversight it can provide.  There 
is simply not enough time or resources between 435 Representatives, 100 Senators, and their 
staffs, to provide the requisite support to, and oversight of, each industry. 
 
 As the United States became an industrialized nation, the first independent oversight 
agency created by Congress was the Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) in 1887.  It served 
as an experiment in government-industry relations, with Congress adopting a hands-off approach 
to reform policy (Bernstein, 1955).  The ICC was weak at first because of limited enforcement 
mechanisms, but grew in power and scope through the years, retaining a relatively independent 
status.  The ICC became a model for later independent regulatory agencies.  
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2.1.2 Agency regulation 
 
 One of the major benefits that an independent regulatory agency provides is a deep level 
of technical expertise and sophisticated understanding of an industry (Bernstein, 1955).  The 
regulators maintain closer ties with industry and greater concentration of expertise than would be 
possible by Congress (Ogus, 2002).  With detailed focus and analysis, however, come limitations 
of scope, power, and expediency.  Slow-acting, commission-based regulation is a precise tool 
that is limited in its functionality (Eisner, 1993). 
 
 The independent agency model of government regulation is constructed to satisfy a wide 
variety of stakeholders, including Congress and the industries themselves (Bernstein, 1955).  
These players find broadly distributed power most beneficial to their own interests.  This allows 
Congress more influence than if a regulatory body were centralized in the executive branch.  It 
allows industry more flexibility and understanding from the government than if the regulatory 
bodies were not as independent and expert-based.  The system also satisfies politicians who 
would rather not make difficult choices that may alienate one interest group or another (Ogus, 
2002).  Agencies, however, are not removed from politics, and a balance must be struck between 
providing pure technical expertise and recognizing the reality that agencies are led by political 
appointees (Kohlmeier, 1969). 
 
Agencies must also remain responsive to public concern ―heard in adversary 
proceedings‖ or else face problems with Congress (Hilton, 1972).  Some ways of assuring 
accountability are collecting citizen comments, requirements of outside consultation, and 
publication of major decisions.  An independent regulatory agency, while not controlled directly 
by its legislative and executive stakeholders, is also accountable to their requests for process 
transparency (Ogus, 2002). 
 
 Regulation is a two-way street, serving regulators and industry alike.  Regulation serves 
industry because the scrutiny involved in regulation confers legitimacy to the industry (Shaffer, 
1995).  Without a trusted third party expert declaring that an industry‘s products are safe, public 
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purchasing skepticism would be much higher.  By weaving together the motivations of industry 
and regulators, a mutually beneficial regulatory paradigm is achieved (McCraw, 1984). 
 
But is regulation always necessary?  Can governmental bodies be too eager to regulate?  
Those with a strict market perspective would contend that regulation should only be turned to in 
the case of market failure (Ogus, 2002), which stems from a mismatch of stakeholder incentives 
and behaviors (Wolf, 1978).  When this is the case, regulatory bodies are called upon to provide 
the proper incentives.  There are several categories of market failure: monopolies, inadequate or 
asymmetrical information, externalities, and co-ordination problems. 
 
2.1.3 Rulemaking 
 
Regulatory intervention is never perfect, and no approach is guaranteed to succeed (Wolf, 
1978).  There are strategies on how to design rules, including questions that rule-makers should 
consider and pitfalls to avoid.  Figure 1 shows the balance that regulators face: 
 
 Key questions Mistakes to avoid 
  
 
Figure 1: Mechanics of rule-making 
based on (Baldwin, 1990)  
Which 
enforcement 
strategies and 
rule types will 
best influence the 
hazard creators?
Which areas 
are not 
suitable for 
regulation?
What are 
the key 
hazards & 
who creates 
them? 
Over-complicated, 
inaccessible rules 
for the well-
intentioned but 
ill-informed.
Informing 
the ill-
intentioned, 
ill-informed.
Punishing 
the well-
intentioned
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A regulatory body must remain flexible and open to change over time (McCraw, 1984).  
Circumstances, the public, and governments change, and firms adapt to regulation (Shaffer, 
1995).  The politics of regulation must also remain in a regulator‘s mind, with an effective result 
being rationally, emotionally, and politically satisfying (Bernstein, 1955; Stone, 2002).  Not 
every rule-type will fit every situation (Baldwin, 1990).  Table 1 illustrates rule types versus 
requirements and costs. 
 
Table 1: Rule types 
based on (Ogus, 2002) 
 
Rule type Requirements Costs 
Prior 
approval 
Requirement of license from 
approving agency 
 High administrative cost 
 Lost opportunity cost from approval delays 
 Can create social welfare cost of barriers to entry 
Mandatory 
standards 
Performance or specification 
standards 
 Costs of being technologically informed as to 
feasibility of meeting standards goals 
 Administrative costs 
Information 
disclosure 
Disclose to purchasers of 
potential harms or risks of product 
 No welfare losses from customers deprived of choice 
 Low administrative costs 
Economic 
instruments 
Tax or charge 
 Optimally equal to consequences of undesired behavior 
 Conduct unconstrained, but firms must pay for 
undesired behavior 
 
 There are problems and benefits with centralized regulation.  On one hand, it simplifies 
matters by reducing the number of rules that must be written, proposed, adopted, monitored, and 
enforced.  However blanket policies can create outcomes that are less favorable to one segment 
of the population than another.  Lastly, if only one regulatory scheme is available, it faces no 
competition and little incentive for experimentation. 
 
2.1.4 Outcomes of regulation 
 
 While government regulation exists to protect the public, it seeks to avoid significantly 
retarding industrial growth (Eisner, 1993).  Complaints about regulation often focus on it 
impeding ―economic efficiency‖ (McCraw, 1984).  Cost-benefit analyses may be used to 
evaluate regulation using objective criterion (Hahn, 1996) and tailored to each industry (Graham, 
1996).  The outcome may sway regulators to pursue alternative measures, if they buy the claim 
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that ―more than half of the federal government's regulations would fail a strict benefit-cost test 
using the government's own numbers‖ (Hahn, 1998). 
 
 As the consequences of regulation may help create ―winners‖ and ―losers‖, ―the single 
constant in the American experience with regulation has been controversy.‖ (McCraw, 1984)  
Judgment of a regulatory body‘s success in balancing efficiency and equitability (Stone, 2002) 
should be taken in their historical context (McCraw, 1984).  Failure in regulation can be due to 
vague standards (Friendly, 1962), difficulty of understanding (Eisner, 1993), undisciplined 
enforcement (Lave, 1982), and inflexibility across contrasting situations (Baldwin, 1990).   
 
 Even where industry can see benefit from regulation, it is rare that regulation will be 
proposed without some amount of resistance (Bernstein, 1955).  One reason that emerging 
technology industries resist is that they fear that too many rules too early will stifle innovation.  
This concern dates back to the 19
th
 century when Congress puzzled with the dilemma of 
toughening railroad safety regulation without impeding development (McCraw, 1984). 
 
 While industries will often oppose government regulation, the regulatory mechanism is 
generally influenced by industry interest groups (Bernstein, 1955; Shaffer, 1995) and may even 
end up ―captured‖ by the regulated (Stigler, 1971).  The types of regulatory contributions and 
powers that an industry may seek from government are increased difficulty of entry by new 
competitors (McCraw, 1984), direct money, policy over ―substitutes and complements‖, and the 
fixing of prices (Stigler, 1971). 
 
2.1.5 Self regulation 
 
 Government regulation ranges in degrees of control, from no regulation to full 
government ownership, and many steps in-between.  Several grades are displayed in Figure 2 on 
the next page, which summarizes Garvin‘s regulatory spectrum. 
 
One regulatory option on the spectrum with a smaller degree of direct government 
control is self regulation (SR), which in its pure form is just slightly more restrictive than no 
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regulation at all.  We will adopt the definition of SR as ―a regulatory process whereby an 
industry-level, as opposed to a governmental- or firm-level, organization (such as a trade 
association or a professional society) sets and enforces rules and standards relating to the conduct 
of firms in the industry." (Gupta & Lad, 1983).  SR also encompasses information disclosure, 
product rating, coding conduct, creating safety standards, and guarding against deception from 
firms (Garvin, 1983).   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: The regulatory spectrum 
based on (Garvin, 1983) 
 
 Certain conditions in an industry will make SR more appropriate and likely.  One of these 
is effective internal governance (Doyle, 1997), such as a strong trade association which 
facilitates cooperation among firms (Gupta & Lad, 1983).  External factors are important as well, 
such as strong incentives from both the public and private sectors to adopt SR (Gunningham & 
Rees, 1997).  Market share stability is another important precursor (Garvin, 1983), as is allaying 
government anti-trust concerns (Hemphill, 1992) and being cost effective (Ogus, 1995). 
 
The proper, non-fear-based (Nunez, 2001), incentives must exist to ensure SR in a way 
that increases the welfare of both industry and public (Maitland, 1985).  Government incentives 
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such as less onerous inspections and preference in purchasing (Lenox & Nash, 2003), enable the 
prospect of industries ―doing well by doing good.‖ 
 
This system is only sustainable if firms truly earn these benefits and ―adverse selection‖ 
(Akerlof, 1970) is avoided.  SR bodies do not have the power of the state to ―coerce‖ through 
taxation, seizure, and eminent domain (Stigler, 1971).  However, mature trade associations 
sometimes serve as better mechanisms for enforcement, especially when they represent the large 
majority of firms and activity in the industry and can better assure compliance (Hemphill, 1992). 
 
SR is ―very rarely successful as a ‗stand-alone‘ mechanism of social control.‖ 
(Gunningham & Rees, 1997)  A mix between self and statutory regulation seems to offer the best 
combination of the positive traits that both have to offer, while offsetting each other‘s 
weaknesses.  SR includes the benefits of flexibility, cost savings, and more efficient information 
gathering.  It also includes the weaknesses of barriers to entry, free-riding, and potential of 
reduced competition.  The greatest weakness of SR is the difficulty of enforcing regulations, but 
this can be offset by government (Doyle, 1997).  The governmental role can be either process-
based (insuring ―equitable procedures,‖ due process, and enforcement) or expertise-based 
(unbiased technical review, standards advising, and limited regulatory authority) (Garvin, 1983).  
Ultimately, the two systems can feed off of one another, with self regulation informing statutory 
regulation about industry-specific best practices (Hemphill, 1992). 
 
2.2 Risk and safety 
 
 Before considering government regulation of risk and safety in high-risk recreational 
activities, we will discuss risk, adventure, and safety theory.  Risk is the ―potential to lose 
something of value‖ (Priest & Baillie, 1987), a combination of the ―likelihood of an accident and 
the severity of the potential consequences‖ (Leveson, 1995).  Adventure is ―voluntary 
engagement in novel, uncertain, and most often emotionally intense recreational activity‖ 
(Holyfield, Jonas, & Zajicek, 2005).  There are many sorts of adventure, each with different 
levels of risk and different participant motivations (Sung H. H., 2000).  We will be considering 
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physical adventure that involves surrendering some or all control to equipment or professional 
guides in order for unskilled participants to be able to engage in the activity (Buckley, 2006). 
 
The perception of safety is more flexible and contextual, as ―a thing is safe if its attendant 
risks are judged to be acceptable.‖ (Lowrance, 1976)  When considering safety and risk versus 
reward of an adventure activity, an individual must balance several factors, as must a 
governmental body in determining how to protect participant safety.  To individual and 
government alike, the question is ―how safe is safe enough?‖ (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, 
Read, & Combs, 1978) 
 
2.2.1 Motivation of risk seeking 
 
We first discuss the risk process on the individual level, to understand what motivates 
people to put themselves into danger in the pursuit of thrills (Mitchell, 1983).  Participants in 
adventure tourism are most often 25-55 years old, have gone through higher education, are 
middle class or higher, and live and work in urban environments (Loverseed, 1997; Sung H. H., 
2001; Gray, 2006).  This set overlaps with the set of individuals likely to be early space tourists. 
 
 Participants in these dangerous activities choose to get involved because of anything from 
the search for youthful feelings to challenging mortality itself to pride and social standing 
(Gutman & Frederick, 2002).  Adventure seeking is motivated by a combination of ―identity 
construction‖ (Celsi, Rose, & Leigh, 1993), skill enhancement, community, and confidence of 
controlling the experience (Shoham, Rose, & Kahle, 2000).  One subset of adventure motivation 
is the desire to gain prestige through activities that ―should be unusual or exclusive, and perhaps 
inspire admiration or envy in others‖ (Swarbrooke, 2003).  While some are motivated by at the 
end result, others approach adventure activities seeking novel and thrilling experiences (Jack & 
Ronan, 1998) that provide ―relatively high levels of sensory stimulation‖ (Muller & Cleaver, 
2000) removed from the participant‘s natural environment (Sung, Morrison, & O‘Leary, 1996).  
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2.2.2 Risk perception 
 
 Risk perception is critical in risk management (Cheron & Ritchie, 1982).  In each risk 
choice and an individual‘s perception of it, there are a number of psychological factors at play, 
including trust, harm, control, choice, certainty, and familiarity
2
.  Risk perception is not 
consistent across the board, as people perceive risk to others differently than to themselves.  
Individuals may under-perceive risk, their ―risk denial‖ leading to ―unrealistic optimism‖ 
(Sjoberg, 2000).  This sometimes causes individuals to assume more risk than they realize. 
 
The calculation to determine the value to an individual of participation in a high-risk 
recreational activity is the product of motivational strength, probability of success, and incentive 
value (Atkinson, 1957).  If an activity is deemed very high in value, even a lower probability of 
success may still result in an attempt.  This internal process sorts out participants to activities and 
levels of risk and safety that are appropriate to their own values. 
 
 In adventure, risk perceptions are often skewed by individuals (Rossi & Cereatti, 1993), 
though perception can be managed by adventure operators
3
.  Adventure operators can either talk 
risks up or down to enhance the participants‘ experience (Swarbrooke, 2003).  Ultimately, we 
must consider all factors in risk perception as they will influence the individual looking to 
participate or government looking to regulate, regardless of how subjective those factors are 
(Rowe, 1988).  For the next step in the risk process, we look at risk assessment. 
 
2.2.3 Risk assessment and communication 
 
 The objective determination of risk probabilities is a critical component of overall risk 
assessment and management (Starr & Whipple, 1980; Haimes, 2004).  It is highly technical and 
specific to each activity, and generally attractive as an unbiased measure of risk.  However, it 
requires social context (Rowe, 1988).  Risk assessment can be considered somewhat subjective, 
                                                 
2
 Antuňano, M. (2007, October 31). ―Regulatory Medical and Safety Aspects of Space Tourism‖. MIT Space, 
Policy, and Society research group. Cambridge, MA, USA: Federal Aviation Administration. 
3
 Morrissey, S. (2008, March 3). When Adventure Tourism Kills. Retrieved March 4, 2008, from Time: 
http://www.time.com/time/nation/article/0,8599,1718951,00.html 
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as much ―art‖ as ―science‖ (Goldstein, 1996).  The judgment required to assess risk requires a 
foot in the technical world as well as an understanding that the assessed level of risk may be 
taken by the public policy world as fact without discussion of uncertainty (Jasanoff, 1993). 
 
 Governmental bodies use risk assessment to determine how to respond to risks that may 
threaten public health and safety.  As it is defined by National Research Council (NRC): ―Risk 
assessment is the use of the factual base to define the health effects of exposure of individuals or 
populations to hazardous materials and situations.‖ (National Research Council, 1983).  Some 
sort of risk assessment is critical if there is to be any sort of methodological basis to regulating 
risk (Lave, 1982).  Risk assessment has in fact become an important tool for governmental 
regulatory bodies (Dudley & Hays, 2007). 
 
 Risk assessment is a prelude to risk management, both of which cannot be fully isolated 
from one another (National Research Council, 1983; Jasanoff, 1993).  However, the two must 
not become too tangled, lest one adversely taint the mission of the other.  Current government 
policy specifies that a clear distinction must be made between the two, if not a complete 
separation (Dudley & Hays, 2007).  This distinction, allows independence without blindness. 
 
Risk management includes risk communication, which should be clear, accurate, and 
objective (Dudley & Hays, 2007).  There are challenges in relaying risk information, for the 
public may not understand technical details conveyed in probabilistic form (Nelkin, 1989).  
Complicating matters, the media is not exceptionally skilled at conveying these messages either, 
sometimes resorting to the sensational (Morgan M. G., 1993).  However, despite the challenges 
of communicating risks, it is necessary to preserve transparency in the public interest. 
 
2.2.4 Risk acceptance and uncertainty 
 
 Once risk is perceived, assessed, and communicated, the question of risk acceptance 
arises (Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeney, 1981; Derby & Keeney, 1990).  
Voluntarily assumed risk, the subject of this thesis, is much different and better tolerated than 
involuntarily or unknowingly assumed risk (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & Combs, 
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1978; Viscusi & Zeckhauser, 1990), up to 1000 times more tolerated by one measure (Starr, 
1969).  However, even if an individual or group is willing to accept risks carte blanche, 
government may still attempt to impose protections (Rowe, 1988). 
 
 Risk need not always or ever be nonzero, as ―risk is not always undesirable‖ (Abraham, 
1986).  Though risk generally carries a negative connotation, it may be considered a positive on 
occasion, and depends highly on context (Starr, 1969).  This goes back to risk perception, where 
quantitative risk measures may not tell the entire story.  Risk acceptance is very much a snapshot 
in time, with results in the present not necessarily corresponding to prior levels of risk 
acceptability or predictive of future trends (Otway, 1982). 
 
 In order to have any meaning in a policy environment, value must be assigned to risk in 
order to determine regulatory priorities.  One way to assign value to various risks is through the 
potential benefits that taking such risks may accrue (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & 
Combs, 1978) and the potential downsides that may arise should the risk result in failure.  
Various relationships have been proposed, from risk acceptability as ―crudely proportional to the 
third power of the benefits (real or imagined)‖ to measuring dread using the ―psychological 
yardstick‖ of death from disease (Starr, 1969). 
 
Risk is critical to the experience of adventure activities (Ewert A. W., 1989), to make 
them worth the participant‘s ―time, resources, energy, and possibly even health and life‖ 
(Mitchell, 1983).  An attempt to remove too much risk from adventure may negate the reasons 
for the activity in the first place (Ryan, 2003).  Even in high-risk situations, the high value of the 
adventure experience may overcome a potential participant‘s aversion to risk (Meier, 1978).  
Each individual will establish their own risk-value mix (Ewert & Hollenhorst, 1989).  Risk 
acceptance in adventure, while voluntary, must still be carefully managed and offered with an 
explicitness that matches the seriousness of the risk (Swarbrooke, 2003). 
 
Such warnings are to make very clear the expectations and realities of the activity, and to 
clear up any misperceptions before the adventure commences.  Informed consent is a type of risk 
acceptance, with a formalized informational and consent feedback mechanism, having begun in 
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the medical profession (Schuck, 1994).  As a protection mechanism, it assures that individuals or 
groups who offer a risky product or service are protected as well. 
 
2.2.5 Uncertainty 
 
In any sort of system that assesses, accepts, and manages risks, there will be an element 
of uncertainty (Morgan & Henrion, 1990).  This is especially true when considering risks 
inherent in emerging technologies, new industries, or ones with rare but catastrophic failures.  
For these activities, recognizing uncertainty is even more important as ―good actuarial data‖ is 
typically not available (Morgan M. G., 1993).  Individuals make better decisions when better 
informed, and industries that deal with hazardous uncertainties should be made to share with 
customers what they don‘t know and where experts disagree (Fischhoff, Bostrom, & Quadrel, 
1993).  CHS fits this description, as there will be uncertainty for some time to come. 
 
Including uncertainty in risk analysis allows use of limited data combined with expert 
judgment to make better decisions before better data is available.  When judgment calls are 
made, ―they should not be hidden but should be set forth carefully, openly, and explicitly,‖ with 
acknowledgment of significant expert disagreements when they exist (Morgan, Henrion, Morris, 
& Amaral, 1985).  Doing so transparently allows an observer to assess on his or her own if those 
judgments are appropriate, and how the analysis might differ using other judgment calls. 
 
2.2.6 Risk management 
 
Once a risk has been assessed, communicated, and accepted, it can be managed it to 
protect public welfare.  The first step is classifying how to approach the risk.  Three approaches 
are ―utility based‖ where pros and cons are scored, ―rights based‖ which is based on justice, and 
―technology based‖ which calls for risk management as capable as current technology will allow 
(Morgan M. G., 1993). 
 
 Governmental regulatory bodies often seek to manage risk in some meaningful way.  The 
NRC definition states: ―Risk management is the process of weighing policy alternatives and 
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selecting the most appropriate regulatory action, integrating the results of risk assessment with 
engineering data and with social, economic, and political concerns to reach a decision‖ (National 
Research Council, 1983).  The current Office of Management and Budget/Office of Science and 
Technology Policy guidelines state: 
 
 In making significant risk management decisions, agencies should analyze the 
distribution of the risks and the benefits and costs (both direct and indirect, both 
quantifiable and non-quantifiable) associated with the selection or implementation 
of risk management strategies.  Reasonably feasible risk management strategies, 
including regulation, positive and negative economic incentives, and other ways 
to encourage behavioral changes to reduce risks (e.g., information dissemination), 
should be evaluated.  Agencies should employ the best available scientific, 
economic and policy analysis, and such analyses should include explanations of 
significant assumptions, uncertainties, and methods of data development. (Dudley 
& Hays, 2007) 
 
 These guidelines are to help executive agencies serve the public.  Public input should also 
play a role in crafting such guidelines by providing the values on which risk management 
decisions are based (Morgan M. G., 1993).  The public also instigates regulation, as ―government 
regulates whenever public pressure builds up to make it regulate‖ (Lowrance, 1976). 
 
Risk management principles and objectives should be as clear as possible (Sapolsky, 
1990).  This task is sometimes confounded by legislative mandates that leave agency goals and 
objectives vague for political purposes (Derby & Keeney, 1990).  Legislatively-granted authority 
that is ―clear, feasible, and predictable‖ can lead to improved coordination and consistency 
(Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Slovic, Derby, & Keeney, 1981). 
 
As the number of people who crave greater ―authenticity‖ in their recreational activities 
grows larger, adventure sports have an ever-expanding set of risk management issues.  
Adventure operators walk a fine line, with their clientele (particularly one-time thrill seekers) 
demanding the feeling of risk in their adventure experience but not wishing to be hurt as a result 
(McEwen, 1983; Holyfield, Jonas, & Zajicek, 2005; Gray, 2006).  Proper safety design and 
operation can help to assure that this balance gets the best of neither operator nor participant. 
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2.3 Technological risk and disaster 
 
 Some risk issues are inherent to technology and the balance between benefits, risks, and 
uncertainty that new technology brings.  While technology can bring countless benefits, it can 
also claim money and lives when it goes wrong (Fischhoff, Slovic, Lichtenstein, Read, & 
Combs, 1978).  Short of ceasing the pursuit of new technologies, these risks must be dealt with.  
Managing technological risk is highly context-dependent, and should account for information 
available, values, stakeholders, politics, and historical background (Otway, 1982).  Without the 
accompanying societal information, a purely technical risk analysis is unlikely to provide much 
benefit to the policymaker. 
 
 Technological risk is very difficult to manage because the course of an emerging 
technology is very difficult to predict (Jasanoff, 1986).  Still, regulatory decisions must often be 
made with educated predictions that take into account potential future ―scientific, economic, and 
technological events‖ (Lave, 1982).  In these cases, uncertainty techniques will help to craft 
flexible and responsive regulatory schemes from limited information.   
 
Some technological failings are catastrophic, qualifying as bona fide disasters.  The 
causes of disaster may be manifold, ranging from poor management to conduct to unanticipated 
interactions in the functioning of a large, complex system (Turner, 1994).  The feeling of 
routineness that develops over time in any system can prove fatal.  In the case of the Challenger 
accident and its ―normalization of deviance‖: 
 
The cause of disaster was a mistake embedded in the banality of organizational 
life and facilitated by an environment of scarcity and competition, and 
unprecedented, uncertain technology, incrementalism, patterns of information, 
routinization, organizational and interorganizational structures, and a complex 
culture. (Vaughan, 1996) 
 
Disasters waiting to happen are inadvertently built into most complex systems, the result 
of ―unanticipated and often baffling interactions‖ (Sagan, 1993).  This class of disasters is known 
as ―normal accidents‖ (Perrow, 1984).  These interactions develop in six categories: design, 
equipment, procedures, operators, supplies and materials, and environment, and can be ―tightly 
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coupled‖ (more time-dependent) or ―loosely coupled‖ (less invariant).  An accident is an 
―unintended and untoward event that causes damage sufficient to disrupt ongoing or future 
tasks‖ and involves complete subsystems or the whole system.  An incident is a minor accident 
involving a part or unit. 
 
Normal accidents are bound to occur because of the incomprehensibility of emergent 
disaster patterns that are most often only able to be clearly spotted and translated in hindsight 
(Perrow, 1984).  Emergent systems must be carefully observed, and cannot be considered 
completely safe and reliable until the system has had the opportunity to cycle through a wide 
variety of situations.  Any complex system may fail in an unexpected, rapid, and chaotic fashion 
that may be set off by just a minor, seemingly unrelated glitch (Faulkner, 2001). 
 
 The risk of disaster is present at an elevated level in adventure activities (Murphy & 
Bayley, 1989) and is even used to sell the activities (Palmer, 2002).  Still, participants expect to 
be kept safe as they venture into harm‘s way in adventure activities across the board.  Comparing 
regulation, oversight, and risk-mitigation models between adventure industries yields valuable 
lessons for CHS participant safety protection going forward. 
 
2.4 Adventure sports 
 
To begin with a disclaimer, adventure sports fail as a model for space tourism on many 
counts.  Comparing public safety protection between these two enterprises is not useful, as they 
face different technical challenges and consequences.  If a sky diving parachute fails to deploy, 
for example, the only people likely to be injured or killed are the jumper and perhaps anyone 
unfortunate enough to be standing directly beneath.  If, however, a spacecraft explodes, debris 
and toxic substances may rain down over a large area and cause a significant degree of damage. 
 
Further, comparisons of the enterprises with one another on expense, technical 
complexity, public perception, or potential industry growth all proves false.  Space tourism will 
be more expensive to build and participate in than adventure sports, relies on much more 
advanced technologies, is much more closely watched by the public given the few industry 
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players and the novelty of the industry, and may possibly grow one day into the foundation for 
more advanced applications such as space industrialization. 
 
 However, the comparison is quite apt in the case of protection of participant safety.  In 
both instances, there are willing, voluntary participants who know that they will be engaging in 
an activity that is high-risk.  Both adventure sports and space tourism require some non-
negligible investment of money and time.  When either goes badly, there is a significant chance 
of serious injury or death.  Both offer activities that were initially only open to trained and skilled 
individuals, but are now open to a much larger population.  Both also require basic physical 
health to participate and the guidance or complete custody of a trained operator. 
 
In both adventure sports and space tourism, there may be dangerous information 
asymmetries, where the participant may not be keenly aware of all of the risk factors involved in 
the activity.  Also, both are subject to regulation designed to protect even willing participants. 
 
The adventure sports which are most closely related to space tourism in the areas of 
interest possess certain useful, analogous characteristics: 
 
 Thought of as ―risky‖ and ―dangerous‖ by the general public.  In one study, skydiving 
was even rated as more risky in an opinion survey than space travel (Futron, 2002) 
 Unskilled individuals may participate 
 Regulated by government authority in some ways to protect passenger safety 
 
Three activities of the many in existence meet each of these criteria: bungee jumping, 
hang gliding, and sky diving.  None are considered generally ―safe‖ by the general public, 
though most people are welcome to participate without a great degree of training.  While there 
are skill levels from novice to enthusiast to professional in each of these activities, in each may 
someone who is in reasonably good physical shape sign up, be briefed, and participate all the 
same day.  Finally, each of these three adventure sports is regulated by government. 
 
The regulatory regimes among them range from a large degree of self-regulation to state-
by-state decentralization, and each exhibit change over time.  In 1974, the Federal Aviation 
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Administration (FAA) took its first step into hang gliding regulation, with suggestions for 
operational restrictions related to altitude, airspace, and avoiding densely populated areas.  By 
1982, after ―near-miss reports, complaints from the general and civil aviation community, and a 
perceived disregard for the rules,‖4 the FAA produced Federal Aviation Regulations (FAR), Part 
103: Ultralight Vehicles, which included rules for inspections, certification, registration, and 
operations
5
.  The sport is now in many ways self-governed and self-policed: the United States 
Hang Gliding and Paragliding Association is permitted by the FAA to hand out its own 
―licenses‖, called ratings6.  This was done with the warning that ―should this approach fail to 
meet FAA safety guidelines, further regulatory action may be necessary.‖7 
 
 The sky diving industry also is entrusted with a large degree of self-regulation, with the 
United States Parachute Association (USPA) as the key oversight agency.  It describes itself as 
―a membership association by, for, and about skydivers—that is, people who intentionally jump 
from aircraft.‖8  Sky diving regulation is guided by four primary documents: FAR Part 105 on 
―Parachute Operations‖, FAR Part 91 on ―General Operating and Flight Rules‖, FAA Advisory 
Circular 105-2 on ―Sport Parachute Jumping‖, and FAA Advisory Circular 90-66 on 
―Recommended Standard Traffic Patterns for Aeronautical Operations at Airports Without 
Operating Control Towers‖.  The FAA retains certain direct oversight by controlling 
manufacturing standards, parachute riggers, and reserve parachute packing
9
.  The National 
Transportation Safety Board also oversees aspects of the industry, such as the safety of the 
planes that transport skydivers
10
.  However, USPA oversees compliance with the Basic Safety 
Requirements and issues skydiving licenses, which are recognized internationally by the 
International Parachuting Commission of the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale. 
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 Throughout the early history of modern bungee jumping, there were calls for regulation.  
Congress passed the Consumer Product Safety Act in 1972, which created the United States 
Consumer Product Safety Commission (US CPSC), an independent federal regulatory agency 
designed to protect the public from ―unreasonable risks of injury and death‖ from consumer 
products
11
.  The bungee jumping industry operated without a fatality from the sports inception in 
1979 until a fatal accident in California in 1991.  The California Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration began issuing regulations on bungee jumping on November 25, 1991.  Then, on 
July 24, 1992, the California State Legislature passed AB 2778, formally adding bungee jumping 
to the list of amusement rides that were to be overseen and regulated by the state (O'Connor & 
Swenson, 1997).  Following this, states across the nation began mandating stricter government 
regulation and oversight of bungee jumping companies.  The result of this was that bungee 
jumping operators ―started dropping like flies‖, eventually whittling the industry down to 12-20 
legitimate jump sites across the United States
12
.  Currently, the US CPSC has jurisdiction over 
traveling rides
13
  and all but five states conduct some sort of amusement ride oversight 
(O'Connor & Swenson, 1997).  Private organizations also contribute towards design and 
operation standards for the industry
14
, including ASTM Committee F24 on Amusement Rides 
and Devices, Council for Amusement & Recreational Equipment Safety, National Association of 
Amusement Ride Safety Officials, Outdoor Amusement Business Association, and Amusement 
Industry Manufacturers & Suppliers International, Ltd. 
 
In this chapter, we have explored the theoretical and historical backgrounds of 
government regulation, risk and safety, technological risk and disaster, and adventure sports.  We 
will revisit and synthesize these themes in Chapter 5 after the complete background of the 
history and regulation of CHS that is immediately following in Chapter 3.  
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CHAPTER 3: HISTORY AND REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 
 
 This thesis focuses on government regulation and oversight for protecting passenger 
safety in CHS.  The discussion is centered on suborbital space tourism, as orbital CHS activities 
will not begin operation for at least the next few years.  By that time, there will have been 
enough experience with regulation of suborbital CHS to better inform that discussion.  From this 
point on, CHS will refer to suborbital activities unless otherwise noted. 
 
This chapter will consider the history that has led to the current state of regulation of 
CHS.  From there, we will begin to turn the discussion towards technical considerations and the 
start of policy recommendations. 
 
3.1 Commercial aviation regulatory history 
 
Given that the FAA is currently responsible for regulation and oversight of CHS, and that 
parallels exist between CHS and early aviation (Hudgins, 2002), it is useful to look at the history 
of the commercial airline industry and the evolution of its regulatory system.  This is particularly 
true in the realm of safety regulation. 
 
The first human airplane flight occurred in 1903, and by 1908 the first passenger fatality 
was recorded.  Though the early industry was laissez faire (Komons, 1978), by 1912 the Aero 
Club of America was calling for federal registration of planes and pilot‘s licenses.  The National 
Advisory Committee for Aeronautics (NACA) began pushing for regulation soon after its 
founding in 1915.  President Woodrow Wilson submitted a bill drafted by NACA to Congress in 
1919 that would have allowed the Department of Commerce (DOC) to begin regulating aircraft 
safety, though the bill died through inaction.  In 1922 the Merchants‘ Association of New York 
joined the call for federal safety regulation of commercial aviation (Komons, 1978).  The first 
standardizations in airplanes were implemented during World War I, and commercial aviation 
was first regulated in 1925 with the Kelly Airmail Act (Burkhardt, 1967; Komons, 1978).  
 
34 
By 1926, the nascent aviation industry was again asking for safety regulation.  That year, 
Congress passed the Air Commerce Act, which gave the Secretary of Commerce responsibility 
of ―fostering air commerce, issuing and enforcing air traffic rules, licensing pilots, certificating 
aircraft, establishing airways, and operating and maintaining aids to air navigation.‖15  With this 
authority, the Aeronautics Branch of DOC decreed that all aircraft be federally registered, 
created licenses, and built landing and communications infrastructure (Burkhardt, 1967).  In 
1934, the Aeronautics Branch was renamed the Bureau of Air Commerce and took over air 
traffic control in 1936.  The Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938 created an independent federal 
aviation agency, the Civil Aeronautics Authority, to regulate fares, routes, and safety through the 
Air Safety Board.  In 1940, the Authority split into the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) 
and Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB), both still in DOC (Burkhardt, 1974).  The CAA oversaw air 
traffic control, certification, safety enforcement, and airways, while CAB was responsible for 
safety rulemaking, accident investigation, and economic regulation of airlines. (Briddon, 
Champie, & Marraine, 1974) 
 
Not all stakeholders were pleased with expanded federal regulation.  Edward 
Rickenbacker, an early aviation pioneer, ―resented‖ the amount of control that the CAB imposed 
upon the industry
16
.  But even as aviation regulation continued to expand as the air industry grew 
rapidly after World War II, the regulatory regime struggled to keep pace with the industry.  By 
the late 1950s, there was warning of a ―crisis in the making‖ in airspace management (Burkhardt, 
1967).  In June of 1958, after two midair collisions that year caused by incompatible air traffic 
control systems, and in part spurred by the advent of new airliner jet technology, President 
Dwight Eisenhower asked Congress to commission an independent federal aviation agency
17
. 
 
By August of 1958, the Federal Aviation Act was passed, creating the Federal Aviation 
Agency (FAA), which took over most of CAB‘s safety responsibilities.  Administrator Pete 
Quesada sought to bolster of the FAA‘s safety role, leading the agency to begin conducting its 
own safety tests and regulating safety across the industry (Whitnah, 1966).  The FAA moved 
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largely intact to the new Department of Transportation in 1967, keeping its acronym but 
changing its name to the Federal Aviation Administration.  Most of the CAB‘s remaining 
responsibilities were transferred to the National Transportation Safety Board (Briddon, Champie, 
& Marraine, 1974).  Regulation continued to expand until the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 
essentially finished the CAB, which officially folded after 1984
18
. 
 
Through a combination of technological advances, operational experience, and the FAA‘s 
focus on risk reduction, commercial aviation boasts an impressive safety record.  In 2004, the 
commercial aviation industry as a whole operated 9,886,851 flights carrying 629,739,062 
passengers resulting in 72 incidents or accidents that caused 14 deaths.  This translates to a 
2.2 × 10−8 fatality rate by passenger, or 2.02 × 10−7 fatality rate by flight, with vehicle failure 
rate of 7.28 × 10−6 (Launius & Jenkins, 2006).  The chart below demonstrates flight and fatality 
rates, with the former steadily growing while the latter trends towards zero.  These trends have 
made it possible for passengers to be much more confident in taking a flight, allowing the 
industry to mature and grow. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: History of US commercial aviation 
from (FAA/AST, 2002a) 
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Today, the FAA is involved in a range of activities, from safety regulation, to air traffic 
control, to research and development, to commercial space transportation.  CHS is regulated in 
this last category, through the Office of Commercial Space Transportation (FAA/AST). 
 
3.2 Commercial spaceflight history 
 
Commercial interests have participated in spaceflight in one form or another since the 
early days of the space age.  The CS industry began in the US in 1962, when NASA launched 
AT&T‘s Telstar 1 satellite (FAA/AST, 2008b) in accordance with one if its charter goals to 
support CS interests.  The first private American space launch was conducted in 1982 by Space 
Services Inc, a Texas company founded by former astronaut Deke Slayton
19
.  The CS industry 
has continued to grow, and now includes industry groups such as launch vehicle, satellite, and 
ground equipment manufacturing; direct-to-home, VSAT, and satellite data and communication 
services; Global Positioning System (GPS), transponder leasing, mobile satellite telephony, 
Earth observation and mapping, remote sensing, launching experimental payloads, high-
bandwidth and broadband data services, and satellite radio.  The industry overall in 2006 
generated $139 billion in economic activity, $35 billion in earnings, and supported 729,240 jobs.  
This continues the trend of roughly 45-60% increase in economic growth and 15-30% increase in 
jobs every 3-4 years for the last 10 years (FAA/AST, 2008b). 
 
The federal government has been very involved in CS in a number of roles since the 
beginning, serving as a ―customer, investor, and facilitator‖ (FAA/AST, 2008b).  Commercial 
payloads flown on the shuttle were even competing favorably with commercial launchers before 
the practice was stopped altogether after the Challenger accident in 1986 (Gress, 2002a).  The 
federal government currently purchases launch services from the CS industry, with 13 of 15 
expendable launch vehicle (ELV) launches in 2006 carrying government payloads.  It supports 
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new launch vehicle development and regulates the CS industry (FAA/AST, 2008b).  Also, 
FAA/AST together with the military share responsibility for range safety in CHS
20,21
. 
 
3.3 Commercial human spaceflight history to present 
 
 The newest subsector of CS is CHS.  The space community has spoken of the prospect of 
CHS for almost as long as astronauts have been sent into space by government programs.  It has 
only been in the past several years that CHS has begun to demonstrate its potential as a 
technically and commercially viable industry. 
 
 The Ansari X-Prize was instrumental in spurring technological development in the CHS 
industry, and can be seen as the starting point of the modern CHS era.  Founded in 1996, the 
Ansari X-Prize offered $10 million to the first team to privately design, build, and launch a 
spacecraft capable of carrying three passengers to an altitude of 100km, reenter and land it 
safely, and do it again using the same craft within a two-week period (Hughes & Rosenberg, 
2005).  It was modeled after the aviation prizes of the early 20
th
 century, which promoted 
development of the modern air industry.  By 1998 there were eleven reusable launch vehicle 
(RLV) programs in development
22
  and within eight years the competition drew over 20 teams 
from 7 countries.  In 2004, Scaled Composites won the prize with their Burt Rutan-designed and 
Paul Allen-funded RLV SpaceShipOne.  This was a major step in advancing CHS as more 
feasible in the near-term than ever before, and has spurred more space prize schemes such as 
NASA‘s Centennial Challenges, Google‘s Lunar X-Prize, and Bigelow Aerospace‘s America‘s 
Space Prize (FAA/AST, 2008b). 
 
 The first major application of CHS will be space tourism (Launius & Jenkins, 2006), 
which looks to be a real possibility in the next several years.  There is much commercial 
potential, as well as real challenges, in this activity (Dobbs & Newquist, 2001; DFI International, 
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2002; Lambright, 2003; OECD, 2004).  In a recent poll, 39% of Americans from across the 
wealth spectrum said that they would go into space if money were no object
23
, though market 
data shows that willingness is highly dependent on price (Crouch, Devinney, Louviere, & Islam, 
2007).  There have already been five spaceflight participants (SFPs) with a sixth scheduled to 
launch in October 2008.   Each SFP has paid at least $20 million to the Russian space program, 
with the company Space Adventures acting as an intermediary, to be taken by a Soyuz spacecraft 
to the International Space Station for a week to ten days. 
 
 Suborbital space tourism looks to be the activity with the most near-term commercial 
potential.  To estimate consumer demand, an independent survey was commissioned by Futron 
Corporation and conducted by Zogby International in 2002 (updated in 2006) that examined the 
market for space tourism
24
.  The survey interviewed 450 individuals who possess the means to 
participate in space tourism and studied demographics, affordability, interest, novelty, health, 
and market diffusion (Futron, 2002; Futron, 2006).   
 
 Paired with another 2002 report by DFI International, there is a fairly comprehensive set 
of data about how the market is expected to perform economically.  Figure 4-Figure 6 share data 
regarding price elasticity and both demand and revenue forecasts.  Plotted on logarithmic axes, 
the demand curve goes from about 100 passengers per year willing to pay $100,000-$500,000 to 
10,000,000 passengers per year willing to pay $2,000-$6,000. 
 
Forecasting into the future, using Fischer-Pry analysis, there may be anywhere from 
8,000 to 17,000 passengers per year by 2020, depending on whether the market maturation and 
saturation time is 35, 40, or 45 years.  These participation figures could lead to revenues of over 
$650 million by 2020.  These figures should be taken with a grain of salt as they assume no 
major disruptions to the industry through 2020, but they are useful while discussing the best-case 
scenario for the CHS industry.  
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Figure 4: Price elasticity: a market research comparison 
from (DFI International, 2002) 
 
  
 
Figure 5: Passenger demand forecast with different market maturation periods 
from (Futron, 2006) 
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Figure 6: Revenue forecast for suborbital space tourism 
from (Futron, 2006; Starzyk, 2006) 
 
 After SpaceShipOne won the X-Prize, Richard Branson of the Virgin Group announced 
that he would invest in a new company called Virgin Galactic to offer suborbital space tourism 
trips at approximately $200,000 per passenger (Hughes & Rosenberg, 2005).  Over 250 
customers have already booked a seat through approximately 90 agents worldwide, with Virgin 
Galactic having already collected $35 million
25
.  The CHS industry as a whole has reported $268 
million in industry revenue for 2007, $1.2 billion in cumulative investment, and 1,227 workers 
supported, though these numbers include many things beyond actual CHS hardware and sales
26
. 
 
The CHS industry still faces challenges from wary investors unsure if and when they will 
see a return (Launius, 2003), but through a combination of privatization and commercialization 
(Pace, 2003), the industry should soon be in a position to require more government oversight.  
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3.4 Commercial human spaceflight regulatory history 
 
 The foundation for American government regulation of CS is that the US is responsible 
by international treaty for damages to the territory, property, and/or citizens of other nations 
caused by space activities of its agents and citizens, whether government-sponsored or not 
(Hermida, 2004).  The principal governing treaties are the 1967 ―Treaty on Principles Governing 
the Activities of States in the Exploration and Use of Outer Space, Including the Moon and Other 
Celestial Bodies‖ – also known as the ―Outer Space Treaty‖ (Gerhard, 2005) – and the 1972 
―Convention on International Liability for Damage Caused by Space Objects‖, also known as the 
―Liability Convention‖ (Kerrest, 2005).  Since these early treaties, international space law has 
gone from highly international conventions over broad principles to specific legal regimes 
(Benkö & Schrogl, 2005).  There is no current international organization that regulates CS safety 
activities (IAASS, 2007), though the US has played a leadership role. 
 
There was no single regulatory agency responsible for CS when the industry first began.  
Early CS companies had to speak with a wide range of governmental agencies to piece together a 
regulatory stamp of approval.  In 1984, the Commercial Space Launch Act (CSLA) was passed 
directly after Executive Order 12465, giving charge of this industry to the Department of 
Transportation (DOT) (US Congress, 1984) after NASA expressed no interest in this regulatory 
role (Gress, 2002a).  The legislation included a requirement that private American citizens obtain 
a license before launching a vehicle into space
27
.  By 1988 (US Congress, 1988b), DOT had 
established procedures to obtain a commercial space launch license, and asserted that it would be 
responsible for non-governmental launches, whether crewed or uncrewed.   
 
In 1995, regulatory authority was delegated to the FAA within DOT
28
.  In 1998 the 
CSLA was amended by the Commercial Space Act (US Congress, 1998) to regulate noncrewed 
RLVs as well (Macauley, 2005), and the FAA began issuing reentry licenses.  In 2000, 
FAA/AST crafted as complete a regulatory and licensing framework for RLVs as was both 
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technologically feasible and congressionally permitted.  These rules were meant to primarily 
protect public safety from errant launches and reentries.  Companies were required to predict and 
plan for hazards, largely steer clear of populated areas, and demonstrate that their RLV was no 
more dangerous than would be an analogous ELV flight.  A company could receive either a 
mission-specific or general operator license, and in 2004 Scaled Composites won the X-Prize 
with an FAA-issued RLV license (Hughes & Rosenberg, 2005). 
 
The first legislation focused on CHS came in 2004 with the passage of the Commercial 
Space Launch Amendments Act (CSLAA) (US Congress, 2004).  This legislation, amending 
Title 49 of the US Code, Subtitle IX, Chapter 701, had a rocky history, illustrating conflicts 
between different approaches to regulation.  The CSLAA evolved from H.R. 3245 and H.R. 
3752.  The former, known as the ―Commercial Space Act of 2003‖ (US Congress, 2003) was 
heard before the House Science Committee, which discarded it in favor of the more 
comprehensive latter.  That bill passed almost unanimously through the House of 
Representatives, but ran into initial trouble in the Senate.  After Senate edits, the bill was 
resubmitted in the House as H.R. 5382, the CSLAA. 
 
The debate was more vigorous the second time around.  Proponents likened space 
tourism to adventure travel more than to tradition aviation, and did not wish to impede industry 
experimentation.  Opponents felt that informed consent to protect SFPs was not strong enough 
and that waiting for a fatality before beginning the next steps in regulation was both morbid and 
unsafe.  This central tension between ―stifling innovation‖ and ―tombstone mentality‖ resulted in 
contentious debated.  It passed the House but looked headed towards failure in the Senate before 
passing as one of last bills of the 108
th
 Congress.  Unsatisfied with the result, Representative 
James Oberstar introduced H.R. 656 – ―To amend title 49, United States Code, to enhance the 
safety of the commercial human space flight industry‖ – in the 109th Congress, though it gained 
no traction (Hughes & Rosenberg, 2005). 
 
 The CSLAA allowed the FAA to create training and medical standards for passengers 
and crew like the training currently offered at the National AeroSpace Training and Research 
Center (NASTAR Center) in Southampton, PA (FAA/AST, 2008a).  However, the bill did not 
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permit further protection of passenger and crew safety immediately.  By the terms of the 
legislation, they are limited to ―restricting or prohibiting design features or operating practices‖ 
that ―have resulted in a serious or fatal injury … to crew or space flight participants during a 
licensed or permitted commercial human space flight‖ or ―contributed to an unplanned event or 
series of events during a licensed or permitted commercial human space flight that posed a high 
risk of causing a serious or fatal injury … to crew or space flight participants‖ until at least 2012.  
In other words, FAA/AST cannot regulate design or operations until 2012 unless there a flight 
causes serious
29
 or fatal
30
 injury to passengers or crew before that time. 
 
The choice of 2012 as a design and operations regulation starting point was a 
compromise between the majority Republican committee staff who sought 2016 and the minority 
Democratic committee staff who supported an immediate start in 2004.  The majority staff 
philosophically supported a permanent ban, but settled for what they felt would be enough time 
to allow innovation and best-practices designs and operations to evolve.  The 2012 compromise 
was admittedly ―somewhat arbitrary‖, but was the most widely accepted amongst a number of 
timelines and metrics discussed.
31
 
 
Whether or not the 2012 date is still appropriate is a legitimate question.  At the time of 
the 2004 legislation, it appeared as though CHS companies may be operational by 2006.  
However, as of 2008, 2010 looks like a more realistic date.  This has prompted concern within 
the CHS industry, as voiced by the Personal Spaceflight Federation, that 2012 may not still be 
best design and operations regulatory start date.  Further, there is discussion about whether using 
a date rather than a given metric (i.e. number of cumulative flights or passengers) is optimal for 
both protecting participant safety and promoting industry growth. 
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As now stands, FAA/AST can only regulate design and operations to protect the public, 
which may involve some regulation that will also protect passengers and crew as a result.  The 
SFP safety protection mechanism codified by the CSLAA is informed consent (Cloppenburg, 
2005; Knutson, 2007; Walker, 2007).  Potential SFPs must be warned in writing that the vehicle 
is not government-certified as safe, and that accident victims are not covered under government 
indemnification.  Commercial operators must also disclose all pertinent safety information 
(without overwhelming SFPs with information as to bury the most relevant details) and the SFP 
waives liability claims against the federal government (FAA/AST, 2006b).  Not all stakeholders 
are pleased with this approach, with spacecraft designer Burt Rutan calling for more focus on the 
passengers by regulating suborbital spacecraft more like airplanes than like launch vehicles
32
.  
Other commentators liken this regulatory approach to passengers offering themselves up as 
―experiments‖ (Walker, 2007). 
 
As for other features of the CSLAA, ―suborbital rocket‖ was defined as a vehicle that 
uses rocket propulsion in whole or part to embark on a suborbital trajectory and whose ascent 
employs thrust greater than its lift.  Also, the Secretary of Transportation was given freedom to 
determine which office will provide regulation and licensing (though not certification like 
airplanes receive
33,34
), under the condition that only one license be required (Hughes & 
Rosenberg, 2005).  The launch licensing process includes reviews of safety, environmental 
impact, payload, policy, and financial responsibility (GAO, 2006). 
 
FAA/AST currently has a dual regulatory/promotional relationship with the CS industry, 
with a Congressional mandate to ―encourage, facilitate, and promote commercial space launches 
and re-entries‖ (Pelton, 2007).  This role is shared with the DOC35, which was made responsible 
for advocating for the CS industry through the Office of Space Commercialization (OSC) (US 
Congress, 1988a) by the Technology Administration Act of 1988.  However, the OSC has been 
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inconsistent in its functionality, lacking even a director from 2002-2006 and has not played as 
large a role as FAA/AST in CS promotion
36
.  Whether or not FAA/AST‘s promotion 
responsibilities will continue is unclear.  Several other government agencies that once both 
regulated and promoted eventually relinquished the promotional function, such as the United 
States Federal Maritime Board in 1961, the Atomic Energy Commission in 1975, and the FAA in 
1996 in the aftermath of the ValuJet accident.  
 
 A recent report by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) found that FAA/AST 
has been doing a good job of assuring safety through well-defined processes, while minimizing 
compliance costs for companies.  The study points to the fact that none of the nearly 200 FAA-
licensed/primarily Department of Defense (DOD)-operated launches to date have resulted in 
serious accident, injury, or damage.  The report does suggest, however, that the FAA should 
identify the specific ―high risk‖ circumstances that would trigger a stricter design and operation 
regulatory regime (GAO, 2006). 
 
The story of the FAA‘s evolution is similar to the story of the emerging government 
regulatory regime for CHS by FAA/AST.  Both regulatory institutions have had to balance 
between promoting and regulating a nascent, high-tech industry.  The progress of CS and CHS 
make now the right time to make decisions about near-future regulation of passenger safety in 
CHS.  The next section, Chapter 4, provides a technical analysis of critical subsystems, mission 
phases, and HS incidents and accidents to date.  Combined with the theory of Chapter 2 and CHS 
background of Chapter 3, the technical discussion will allow us to make conclusion and 
recommendations in Chapter 5.  
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CHAPTER 4: RISK AND SAFETY IN COMMERCIAL HUMAN SPACEFLIGHT 
 
This technical analysis will discuss the CHS industry, its operating environment and 
vehicles, past and current suborbital HS efforts, critical mission phases and subsystems, risk in 
HS, and historical incident and accident data.  We will find that critical nodes exist in the many 
combinations of mission phases, subsystems, and CHS mission modes.  These will be the targets 
for regulation that we will discuss in the conclusions and recommendations in Chapter 5. 
 
4.1 Definitions 
 
Part of regulating CHS is knowing where space ―begins‖. At as little as 16 km altitude a 
pressure suit becomes necessary, and a rocket engine at 45 km.  The DOD will grant astronaut 
wings when an individual has reached 81 km (Goehlich, 2002).  Other altitudes for space range 
from 96km (Andrews, 2001) to 110 km (Kayser, 2001).  The most internationally-recognized 
boundary of space is the Kármán line at 100 km (62.1 miles), which is the definition accepted by 
the Fédération Aéronautique Internationale (IAASS, 2007).  100km was also the boundary for 
the X-Prize and what most suborbital space tourism operators are striving to reach. 
 
This thesis is considering only suborbital CHS.  The difference between suborbital and 
orbital is an order of magnitude more energy required.  A suborbital spaceflight trajectory 
requires a velocity of between 1-1.5 km/s, while a spacecraft must reach 7.9 km/s to attain orbit 
(International Space University, 2000).  A suborbital spaceflight would provide about 3-5 
minutes in microgravity, while one orbit takes over an hour (Goehlich, 2004).  Because of the 
considerable differences between these two types of space trajectories, most CHS companies are 
pursuing suborbital commercial offerings before orbital options.  
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CHS vehicles will operate both in the lower atmosphere and in space.  To define how a 
vehicle is classified, the International Civil Aviation Organization Convention gives the 
following definitions: 
 
Table 2: Air and space vehicle definitions 
based on (IAASS, 2007) 
 
Term Definition 
Aircraft Any machine that can derive support in the atmosphere from the reactions of the air. 
Aeroplane A power-driven heavier-than-air aircraft, deriving its lift in flight chiefly from 
aerodynamic reactions on surfaces which remain fixed under given conditions of flight. 
Spacecraft A man-made vehicle which is intended to go beyond the major portion of the Earth‘s 
atmosphere. 
Rocket A vehicle or device propelled by one or more rocket engines, especially such a vehicle 
designed to travel through space. 
 
 The distinction between vehicle types is important, for if a CHS vehicle was to be 
considered an aircraft when operating within the atmosphere, it would subject to additional 
regulatory categories by the Chicago Convention.  These include registration, airworthiness 
certification, pilot licensing, and operational requirements (IAASS, 2007). 
 
Some in CHS would prefer that suborbital CHS vehicles be considered aircraft.  Burt 
Rutan has stated that, from a regulatory standpoint, he would rather deal with FAA‘s Aviation 
Safety Office than FAA/AST because the latter focuses ―primarily with the consequences of 
failure, where the aircraft regulatory process deals with reducing the probability of failure.‖37  
There is precedent for hybrid regulatory schemes for vehicles that operate in multiple medium, 
such as military DUKW amphibious vehicles.  These are regulated sometimes as more boat than 
automobile, and vice versa, but usually are subject to aspects of both regulatory regimes 
(Walker, 2007).  
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There are a variety of approaches possible to space vehicle body design.  Each vehicle 
shape poses tradeoffs in maneuverability upon reentry (in terms of lift and drag) and volumetric 
efficiency.  Six potential shapes are considered here: 
 
Table 3: Vehicle body types and tradeoffs 
based on (Petro, 1992; Petro, 2000) 
 
Shape Body type Maneuverability Volumetric efficiency 
 
Spherical Nonexistent Moderate 
 
Heatshield with afterbody Slight Good 
 
Blunt cone Slight Good 
 
Biconic Moderate Excellent 
 
Lifting body High Moderate 
 
Winged body High Good 
 
 Most of the suborbital vehicles that we will consider here are winged bodies.  The 
combination of control, reusability, and enough internal volume to allow SFPs the freedom to 
move in microgravity makes the shape a popular choice. 
 
4.2 Space system design 
 
Beyond body type, boundaries on design options are imposed by technical complexity 
(driven by schedule and design cost), safety for humans and other payload, and economic 
sustainability determined in part by operational costs.  Four of the most important design 
categories are listed in Table 4, with each category‘s design options: 
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Table 4: Design tradeoffs for suborbital space vehicles 
based on (Goehlich, 2004) 
 
Design feature Choice  Take-off and landing acronyms 
Take-off Vertical or horizontal?  HTHL = Horizontal Takeoff, Horizontal Landing 
Stages One or more?  VTVL = Vertical Takeoff, Vertical Landing 
Landing Vertical or horizontal?  VTHL = Vertical Takeoff, Horizontal Landing 
Reusability Partial or full?   
 
 A handful of companies have continued CHS development after the X-Prize (FAA/AST, 
2005e), and each has made a unique set of choices in the design of their vehicles.  This thesis 
will examine only a few of these companies, the ones that have the most publicly available 
information and that are far enough along in development that they stand a reasonable chance of 
being commercially operational within the next several years.  A few CHS companies and 
proposed vehicles will not be considered here because of: 
 
 Insufficient public information: Excalibur Almaz‘s TKS spacecraft derivative and 
Space Adventures‘ proposed Explorer spacecraft to be designed by Russia‘s 
Myasishchev Design Bureau. 
 Space tourism as a secondary objective: SpaceX‘s Falcon-family launch vehicle and 
Dragon spacecraft, and Orbital Science‘s Cygnus launched on their Taurus II, both 
participants in NASA‘s Commercial Orbital Transportation Services program. 
 Orbital destinations: Bigelow Aerospace is designing, testing, and constructing their 
Genesis-family, Sundancer, and BA 330 habitation modules as orbital space tourism 
destinations, but do not have a suborbital program. 
 
 Out of the above design tradeoffs, a few dominant mission modes have emerged.  These 
are listed in Table 5, with the CHS companies which we will be discussing. 
 
Table 5: Suborbital CHS company systems 
based on (FAA/AST, 2005e; Pelton, 2007) 
 
Vehicle company 
(/Operator) 
Launch/ 
Land mode 
Launch vehicle Spacecraft Rocket Propulsion 
Scaled Composites/ 
Virgin Galactic 
HTHL WhiteKnightTwo SpaceShipTwo 
Neoprene (synthetic 
rubber)/N2O 
XCOR HTHL Lynx 
Isopropyl alcohol/ 
Liquid oxygen 
Rocketplane Global HTHL Rocketplane XP Liquid 
Armadillo Aerospace VTVL Pixel and Texel cluster derivative 
Liquid oxygen/ 
ethanol 
Blue Origin VTVL New Shepard 
Hydrogen peroxide/ 
Kerosene 
SpaceDev/Benson Space VTHL Atlas V Dream Chaser Neoprene/N2O 
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Each of these mission modes balances operational benefits with unique technical 
challenges.  HTHL and VTVL are thus far the most popular launch/landing mission modes.  
While VTHL is used by the Space Shuttle, VTVL was used for every prior NASA crewed 
mission prior and is still in use by Soyuz.  HTHL was used by the only successful example to 
date of CHS, and has a rich testing pedigree. 
 
4.2.2 Spaceplanes 
 
 The HTHL mission mode, specifically with a carrier aircraft employed to bring the 
spacecraft to a high starting altitude for space launch, was investigated in great depth with the 
North American Aviation X-15 research ―spaceplane‖.  The X-15 flew under NASA and Air 
Force supervision as part of a government research program, and had a different purpose than 
today‘s CHS companies.  However, with a similar flight profile, and a number of related 
technical challenges, the X-15 is useful to consider from a design and operational perspective. 
 
 There has been a long history of US experimental aircraft, some of which sought to push 
the envelope on altitude and/or speed.  The X-15 is regarded as one of the most successful of the 
approximately 50 experimental planes to date (Jenkins, Landis, & Miller, 2003).  In 1952, the 
NACA Committee on Aerodynamics recommended pursuing a hypersonic (over Mach 5), ultra 
high altitude aircraft as a first step into human spaceflight (Dick, Garber, & Engel, 2000).  The 
build-to-fly process was a collaboration, where contract winner North American Aviation would 
prove airworthiness up to Mach 2, then give the plane to the Air Force, who would then give to 
NASA (Jenkins, 2000).  A prototype was built by the end of 1958, followed by flight tests in 
1959 and the first piloted test in 1960 (Stillwell, 1965). 
 
 There were two types of missions flown: one to set records in altitude and one to set 
records for speed by winged aircraft.  Figure 7 shows the trajectories and dynamic pressures 
involved for each type of mission: 
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Figure 7: Types of X-15 research flights 
from (Jenkins, 2000) 
 
The original goal of the program was to reach a speed of Mach 6 and an altitude of 
250,000 feet.  The program well exceeded both, ultimately achieving Mach 6.7 and 354,200 feet.  
In total, 109 of the 199 flights of the program went hypersonic (Becker, 1968) and two of the 
flights in 1963 exceeded the Kármán 100km altitude line.  Other technical milestones were also 
met, including withstanding 1,350 degrees Fahrenheit of dynamic heating and 2,200 pounds of 
dynamic pressure per square foot. 
 
This was all done at a high price: the final cost summed to over 30 times the original 
estimate, one of the planes was severely damaged, and another was destroyed, taking with it the 
life of test pilot Michael J. Adams (Jenkins, 2000).  There were several subsystems that proved 
problematic, including auxiliary power units (APU), rocket engines, and stability systems 
(Becker, 1968).  The APUs suffered from problems such as valve malfunction, leaks, and 
difficulty of speed control.  The XLR99 rocket engines represented a huge achievement as the 
first large, man-rated, throttleable, restartable liquid propellant rocket engine
38
, but had start-up 
problems and needed to be overhauled after one hour of use. 
 
The thermal issues were among the most daunting.  There is considerable thermal load 
above Mach 6, with X-15 heating in general recorded at 30-40% greater than predicted by theory 
and flight tests (Jenkins, 2000).  The structural design itself was based around mitigating 
                                                 
38
 USAF. (n.d.). Reaction Motors XLR99. Retrieved April 25, 2008, from National Museum of the USAF: 
http://www.nationalmuseum.af.mil/factsheets/factsheet.asp?id=890 
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aerodynamic heating (Price, 1968).  A spray-on ablating surface was employed to protect the 
craft, but it was not considered fully successful due to its performance deficiencies and the large 
amount of maintenance service required on and around the protected surfaces (Jenkins, 2000). 
 
 The program was eventually overtaken in the public imagination by Project Mercury.  By 
1964 there were proposals to end the program, justified by feelings that it was nearing the end of 
its useful research life.  The program finally closed by the end of 1968 due to NASA‘s other 
priorities.  The X-20, known as Dyna-Soar, was to be a follow-on spaceplane capable of 
achieving orbit, but was cancelled before the first vehicle was built (Jenkins, Landis, & Miller, 
2003).  The X-15‘s speed and altitude records stood until the space shuttle broke them for 
winged craft and SpaceShipOne (SS1) beat the altitude record for a suborbital spaceplane. 
 
 Several of the leading suborbital CHS designs can be seen as legacies of the X-15.  The 
two-stage, HTHL design was used by SS1 to win the X-Prize.  In both systems, a subsonic, jet-
powered Stage 1 aircraft brings a Stage 2 rocket-powered spacecraft to a space launch altitude, 
15 km in the case of SS1
39
.  There are also significant differences between the two programs.  
The X-15 reentered with a steeper angle of attack to conduct high-speed research, while SS1 
utilized feathered reentry and a near vertical trajectory
40,41
.  The gentler reentry of SS1 even 
made it possible for the vehicle to eschew an autostabilization system.  Both vehicles featured 
ablative thermal protection, but it was a much lighter ―trowel-on‖ ablative surface for SS1.  The 
high drag-to-weight ratio of SS1 resulted in a more moderate level of peak heating, with a 
thermal protection system (TPS) necessary for only a few hot spots on the mostly graphite-epoxy 
composite structure. 
 
Virgin Galactic intends to follow the same mission mode with SpaceShipTwo (SS2).  For 
purposes of comparison, the following pages illustrate nominal trajectories of the X-15 and SS2, 
as well as are design schematics.  
                                                 
39
 Sweetman, B. (2004, January). SpaceShipOne: Riding a WhiteKnight to Space. Retrieved May 19, 2008, from 
AIAA: http://www.aiaa.org/aerospace/Article.cfm?issuetocid=446&ArchiveIssueID=46 
40
 Dornheim, M. A. (2004, Ocober 10). SpaceShipOne Wins Ansari X Prize. Retrieved May 5, 2008, from Aviation 
Week: http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_generic.jsp?channel=awst&id=news/10114top.xml 
41
 Economist. (2008, January 24). Starship enterprise: the next generation. Retrieved May 19, 2008, from 
Economist: http://www.economist.com/science/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10566293 
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Figure 8: X-15 flight paths in California 
from (Becker, 1968) 
 
 
 
Figure 9: SpaceShipTwo flight profile 
from (Cain, 2008)  
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Figure 10: Modified X-15A-2 labeled schematic 
from (Houston, Hallion, & Boston, 1998) 
 
 
 
Figure 11: Technical snapshot of Virgin Galactic‘s SpaceShipTwo 
from (gizmag, 2008) 
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4.3 Space system operation 
 
 As is evident from the record of the X-15 research program, risk is inherent in suborbital 
spaceflight.  Space hazards include loss of vehicle control, uncontrolled debris, uncontrolled 
release of hazardous materials, vehicle breakup, unsafe landing, explosion, fire, and countless 
other things that can go wrong (FAA/AST, 1995b; AIAA, 2005).  This section will examine 
what can go wrong, when it can go wrong, and the relative criticality of subsystem failures. 
 
4.3.1 Mission phases and hazards 
 
 A suborbital space mission may be divided into several sequential phases
42
: Prelaunch, 
Launch (which can separated into Ground launch and Space launch phases for some two-vehicle 
systems such as WhiteKnightTwo/SpaceShipTwo), Ballistic coast/Spaceflight, Reentry, 
Landing, and Postlanding (FAA/AST, 1995b).  There are hazards associated with each segment 
of the mission (Heydorn & Railsback, 2000).  Table 6 lists the major hazards that correspond 
with each mission phase, and Figure 12 illustrates them graphically. 
 
Table 6: Mission phase definitions and physical stresses: chronological 
 
Mission phase Duration Hazards 
Prelaunch 
The time from initial passenger and crew interface with the system 
(boarding) all the way up to liftoff of the system from the ground. 
Premature launch 
System failure 
Launch 
The time after liftoff (ground launch) that includes the rocket burn 
that provides the speed for a suborbital space trajectory (space 
launch). 
Vibration 
Acceleration 
Structural overload 
Ballistic coast/ 
Spaceflight 
The after the rockets cut out, while the spacecraft ascends into 
space and the passengers can experience microgravity as the 
vehicle crests the trajectory. 
Pressure 
differential 
Thermal shock 
Reentry 
The period when the spacecraft begins to experience resistance 
and friction from the Earth‘s atmosphere as it slows down and 
begins to descend. 
Vibration 
Deceleration 
Structural overload 
Landing 
The time when the spacecraft descends, approaches the landing 
target, and comes to a halt on the Earth‘s surface. 
Mechanical shock 
Postlanding 
The time from when the vehicle stops moving to recovery of the 
passengers and crew. 
Exposure to 
hazardous materials 
 
  
                                                 
42
 Hofstetter, W. (2008, May 15). PhD candidate. (M. E. Leybovich, Interviewer) 
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4.3.2 Subsystems 
 
 Major subsystems for a suborbital spacecraft are described in an overview below.  While 
the design and operation of each subsystem from vehicle to vehicle may vary, the guiding 
principles, responsibilities, and design challenges for each subsystem remain the same (Riley & 
Sailor, 1962; Griffin & French, 1991; Pisacane & Moore, 1994; Wertz & Larson, 1999; Meyer, 
1999; Larson & Pranke, 2000; Fortescue, Stark, & Swinerd, 2003). 
 
Launch and Propulsion 
(Griffin & French, 1991; Humble, 2000a; Humble, 2000b; Turner M. J., 2005) 
 
 This subsystem is the one responsible for getting the spacecraft off the ground and into 
space.  It includes the engines, propellant, propellant tanks, and dumping systems.  Design 
factors include payload mass, mission lifetime, spacecraft dimensions, environmental impacts 
and limitations, reliability and safety, and funding and political constraints.  Designing a launch 
and propulsion system involves setting requirements, sizing the vehicle to be launched, sizing the 
thrust-generation and propellant-handling systems, and selecting a propulsion technology.  
Launch 
Vibration 
Acceleration 
Structural overload 
Ballistic coast/ 
Spaceflight 
Pressure differential 
Thermal shock 
Reentry 
Vibration 
Deceleration 
Structural overload 
Landing 
Mechanical shock 
Prelaunch 
Premature launch 
System failure 
Postlanding 
Exposure to hazardous materials 
Figure 12: Mission phase and physical stresses: graphical 
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Currently available commercial options are primarily limited to chemical propulsion, with 
choices between the following types of fuel (with corresponding specific impulse data): 
 
Table 7: Specific Impulses of chemical propulsion 
 
Type Specific impulse (Isp) in seconds 
Liquid monopropellant 140-235 
Liquid bipropellant 320-460 
Solid 260-300 
Hybrid 290-350 
 
Solid rockets are more reliable and have a higher propellant density, but liquid fuel 
rockets can get higher impulse and have better thrust control and throttleability.  Designing for 
safety means avoiding single-point critical failures and any combination of two failures leading 
to catastrophic failure, as well as providing the delta-v required to achieve the propulsion goal.  
Possible failure modes include premature launch, failing to start or stop on takeoff, thrust 
anomalies, explosion, and failure to restart or stop on command when landing 
 
Attitude Determination and Control System (ADCS)/Guidance, Navigation, and Control (GNC) 
(NASA, 1969; Hughes P. C., 1986; LaBel & Gates, 1996; Noton, 1998; Wie, 1998; Wertz & 
Larson, 1999; Glaese, Eterno, Zermuehlen, & Zimbelman, 2000) 
 
 ADCS and GNC are responsible for tracking the orientation of the spacecraft, and 
keeping it oriented and under control throughout its flight.  ADCS keeps the spacecraft 
positioned about its center of mass, while GNC keeps the spacecraft as a whole positioned in 
relation to the environment.  These subsystems include inertial measurement units (IMUs), sun 
sensors, star sensors, horizon sensors, and magnetometers.  Utilized methods to maintain control 
include gravity gradient, momentum bias wheel, passive magnetic, spin stabilization, thrusters, 
and momentum exchange. 
 
 The design of ADCS and GNS begins with defining and selecting spacecraft attitude 
control modes, followed by quantifying the disturbance environment, selecting and sizing 
hardware, and defining algorithms for determination and control.  The systems must be able to 
determine and control accuracy, range, jitter, drift, and settling time, while avoiding gimbal lock.  
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Possible failure modes include premature or delayed operation, inadvertent operation, drift/shift, 
axis alignment or bias anomaly, and failure to stop.  Following is an example of a GNC system, 
from the X-15. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Functional diagram of the X-15 stability augmentation system 
from (NASA, 1969) 
 
Structure and Mechanisms 
(Doukas, McCandless, Sarafin, & Britton, 1999; Sarafin & Tagg, 2000) 
 
 The structure and associated mechanisms are the most outwardly visible part of the 
system hardware, responsible for holding the craft together.  Included in this subsystem are 
fuselage, wings, stabilizers, doors, elevators, ailerons, rudders, spoilers, flaps, brakes, and drag 
devices.  Commonly used materials include aluminum, titanium, magnesium, beryllium, steel, 
heat-resistant alloys, invar, and graphite. 
 
 Design must account for a number of material properties such as Young‘s modulus, shear 
modulus, ultimate tensile stress, yield stress, proportional limit, elongation, coefficient of thermal 
expansion, and fracture toughness.  The materials are shaped into structures and mechanisms that 
are judged on their stiffness, positional stability, mass, strength, structural life, natural frequency, 
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damping, and mass properties.  Possible failure modes include delayed operation, rubbing or 
fretting, high or low torque, binding or jamming, failure to extend/ or retract, failing mid-travel, 
inadvertent operation of pyros, and structural failure. 
 
Command and Data Handling (C&DH) 
(Berget & Turner, 1999; Comparetto, 2000) 
 
 The command and data handling subsystem is responsible for computational control 
aboard the spacecraft.  These duties are covered by the computers and software on board.  The 
computing systems utilized tend to be older than what is commercially available in consumer 
products because of the high reliability requirements.  Design of C&DH should include 
consideration of data rate, bit-error rate, end-to-end delay, link availability, security, 
standardization, backward compatibility, access, and information source (voice, video, telemetry, 
and data) integration.  Possible failure modes include system overload and erroneous output. 
 
Telemetry, Tracking, and Command (TT&C) 
(Pisacane & Moore, 1994; Ford, 1999) 
 
The telemetry, tracking, and command subsystem is responsible for allowing the 
spacecraft to communicate with mission control.  Associated hardware includes data transmitters 
and receivers, GPS hardware, voice communications, and antennas.  There are several types of 
antennas that may be used, such as axial mode helix, bifilar or quadrifilar helix, parabolic dish, 
corrugated horn, biconal horn, conical log spiral, microstrip array, and halfwave dipole. 
 
Design of this subsystem is largely based around trying to reduce the effects of noise on 
spacecraft-ground communications.  Possible failure modes include antenna radiation pattern 
error or bandwidth anomaly, high or low signal, low electrical signal-to-noise ratio, and 
waveform, bias, or incorrect frequency.  
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Thermal Control System (TCS) 
(Chapman, 1974; Ewert, Curry, Lin, & Brown, 2000) 
 
 The thermal control subsystem is responsible for regulating the heat inside and on the 
outer surface of the vehicle.  The space environment does not allow for dynamic heat exchange 
between vehicle and atmosphere as occurs on Earth, so measures are taken to avoid overheating 
the interior of the spacecraft.  These mechanisms include heat exchangers, coldplates, fluid 
pumps, heaters, radiators, boilers, flash evaporators, sublimators, and general insulation.  Design 
is premised on efficient heat regulation and long-term reliability over many cycles.  Possible 
failure modes include internal or external leakage, flow anomaly, and cavitation. 
 
Power 
(Griffin & French, 1991; Landis, McKissock, & Bailey, 2000; Patel, 2005) 
 
 For the systems to run, power must be provided and maintained.  There are several 
options available to gather power in space, including solar photovoltaic, solar dynamic power, 
nuclear power, and fuel cells.  Power is generally stored in batteries for later use as well.  
Possible failure modes include electrical current leak, loss of output or short circuit, and open, 
high resistance, high voltage or low current. 
 
Environmental Control and Life Support System (ECLSS) 
(Doll & Eckart, 2000) 
 
 A livable and working environment for humans within a spacecraft is monitored and 
maintained by ECLSS.  This subsystem consists of hardware to monitor cabin materials, regulate 
a life-supporting breathing atmosphere and pressure, manage the water and food required by the 
crew, safely store the waste generated by human metabolism and crew activities, and control the 
temperature with the help of TCS.  Possible failure modes include cavitation, internal or external 
leakage, flow anomaly, and failure of pressure maintenance  
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Thermal Protection System (TPS) 
(Thornton, 1996; Ewert, Curry, Lin, & Brown, 2000; Condon, Tigges, & Cruz, 2000; The 
Aerospace Corporation, 2006) 
 
 The thermal protection subsystem is responsible for protecting the spacecraft as it 
reenters the atmosphere from space.  During this mission phase, an extraordinary amount of heat 
is generated, usually more heat than most spacecraft structures would be able to handle without 
shielding.  Four thermal protection methods are used most often: insulated radiative, insulative 
refractory, charring ablator, and absorptive transpiration.  Peak heat load determines material and 
design.  Design efforts are geared towards assuring that the TPS stays safe through all mission 
phases and will function effectively during reentry.  Possible failure modes include loss of 
thermal protection during reentry, which can lead to loss of vehicle. 
 
This review of subsystems tells us what needs to work and what can go wrong.  The next 
step is to analyze which elements are more likely than others to fail.  An examination of actual 
HS incident and accident data will underscore how CHS regulation should be targeted. 
 
4.4 Incidents and accidents in human spaceflight 
 
Risk analyses can provide theoretical probabilities of incident or accident, but the 
historical safety performance of HS falls short of those probabilities.  The safety success rate for 
suborbital HS is perfect thus far in terms of fatalities, with 0 deaths among the 2 suborbital 
flights of Mercury, 2 of X-15
43
, and 3 of SpaceShipOne.  However, the full history of HS is less 
than safety-perfect (Pelton & Novotny, 2006). 
 
As of April 2008, 483 humans have gone into space
44
, of which 18 have died in-flight 
(3.726%).  In terms of total people-trips, the 18 fatalities in 993 attempts make for a 1.813% 
fatality rate.  (Launius & Jenkins, 2006).  By other history-based calculations, current space 
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44
 By United States definition 
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systems have a 1.0-1.5%
45,46
  chance of fatal accident.  Leaders in CHS believe the industry can 
achieve a level of safety equal to the early aviation industry.  That metric would be at least 100 
times safer than current spaceflight
47
, and some predict as low as a 1-in-30,000 (0.003%) chance 
of an accident
48
.  While these rates would still not approach the safety level of commercial 
aviation cited in section 3.1, they would still represent a major improvement for both safety and 
industry likelihood of success. 
 
 More telling than probabilities, however, is actual flight accident and incident data.  For 
the purposes of this section, only incidents and accidents that have occurred during one of the 
spaceflight phases already delineated will be discussed.  The only CHS fatal accident to date, a 
testing accident by Scaled Composites that resulted in three deaths and three serious injuries
49
, is 
tragic and noteworthy but is not included in this analysis as it is best classified as an industrial 
accident.  The regulatory issues discussed here pertain more to protecting under-informed one-
time participants rather than workers engaged in a dangerous industrial profession.  We will also 
not focus on risk factors that are a) exclusively orbital such as pertaining to spacewalks (Alexei 
Leonov having great difficulty reentering the capsule after his Voskhod 2 spacewalk), b) 
missions that last longer and go farther (Apollo 13), or c) related to long duration HS (incidents 
on space station Mir). 
 
Table 8 catalogues incidents and accidents throughout the history of HS that are most 
pertinent to current CHS regulatory issues.  Though the history was researched thoroughly, the 
list is intentionally not comprehensive.  This is done to keep focus on the most relevant historical 
examples that regulators should consider while drafting new rules.  
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Table 8: Incidents and accidents in human spaceflight chronologically 
 
Date Incident/Accident 
Mission 
phase 
Primary 
subsystem 
4/12/ 
1961 
Vostok 1 service module remains attached to reentry module past 
planned separation (Jane's Information Group, 2003). 
Reentry 
Structure & 
Mechanisms 
7/21/ 
1961 
Mercury 4 hatch blows prematurely after water landing, causing 
capsule to sink and near loss of astronaut (NASA, 1961). 
Post 
landing 
Structure & 
Mechanisms 
3/18/ 
1965 
Voskhod 2 lands off-target in Ural Mountains when automatic descent 
system fails and crew is forced to spend a night in the capsule, 
surrounded by wolves (Grahn). 
Reentry 
Structure & 
Mechanisms 
8/29/ 
1965 
Gemini 5 lands 169km short of target due to computer program error 
(NASA, 1965). 
Landing C&DH 
3/17/ 
1966 
Gemini 8 goes into severe spin prior to reentry due to maneuvering 
thruster firing out of control (Jane's Information Group, 2003). 
Space 
flight 
ADCS & 
GNC 
1/27/ 
1967 
Gus Grissom, Edward White II and Roger Chaffee are killed during 
Apollo 1 ground test when spark in cabin ignites fire that was 
exacerbated by all-oxygen environment (White T. G., 2000). 
Pre 
launch 
ECLSS 
4/24/ 
1967 
Vladimir Komarov dies on Soyuz 1 when parachute fails on reentry 
and craft impacts ground (BBC; Associated Press, 2003). 
Landing 
Structure & 
Mechanisms 
11/15/ 
1967 
Michael J. Adams dies on X-15 Flight 191 when plane goes into 
severe spin after electrical and control problems and breaks up during 
flight (Jenkins, 2000; Shayler, 2000). 
Launch 
ADCS & 
GNC 
1/18/ 
1969 
Soyuz 5 service module remains attached to reentry module, causing 
reentry facing the wrong way and off-target landing (Oberg, 2002). 
Reentry 
Structure & 
Mechanisms 
5/22/ 
1969 
Apollo 10 Lunar Module approaches gimbal lock when a GNC switch 
is flipped one too many times due to astronaut miscommunication and 
causes LM to gyrate wildly (Shayler, 2000). 
Space 
flight 
ADCS & 
GNC 
11/14/ 
1969 
Apollo 12 is hit by lighting during ascent, causing several subsystems 
to temporarily fail (NASA, 1970). 
Launch Power 
6/30/ 
1971 
Georgi Dobrovolski, Viktor Patsayev and Vladislav Volkov die on 
Soyuz 11 when cabin became depressurized while in space (NASA). 
Space 
flight 
ECLSS 
4/5/ 
1975 
Soyuz 18a encounters a second stage separation failure on launch that 
causes crew to experience 21.3g acceleration during abort due to 
altitude error (Shayler, 2000). 
Launch 
Structure & 
Mechanisms 
7/24/ 
1975 
Apollo-Soyuz Test Project (ASTP) US crew are nearly fatally 
exposed to nitrogen tetroxide (N2O4) gas in capsule during descent 
due to switch left in wrong position (Redmond, 2004). 
Landing ECLSS 
10/16/ 
1976 
Soyuz 23 lands in frozen lake and is dragged underwater by 
parachutes that fill with water (Wade, 2007). 
Post 
landing 
Structure & 
Mechanisms 
9/26/ 
1983 
Soyuz T-10-1 aborts on launch pad and escape system carries crew to 
safety with 20g acceleration (Jane's Information Group, 2003). 
Pre 
launch 
Launch & 
Propulsion 
12/8/ 
1983 
STS-9 has two General Purpose Computers (GPCs) short out after 
Reaction Control System (RCS) thruster jars piece of solder loose 
(NASA). 
Space 
flight 
C&DH 
12/8/ 
1983 
STS-9 has two Auxiliary Power Units (APUs) fail after they catch on 
fire due to hydrazine leak during landing (Doherty, 1988). 
Landing Power 
7/29/ 
1985 
STS-51-F experiences a main engine shutdown, nearly followed by a 
second one, due to a false high temperature reading, which caused the 
shuttle to Abort to Orbit (Dumoulin, 2001). 
Launch 
Launch & 
Propulsion 
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Date Incident/Accident 
Mission 
phase 
Primary 
subsystem 
1/28/ 
1986 
Space Shuttle Challenger explodes 73 seconds after takeoff due to 
faulty O-ring seal allowing hot gases to escape from the Solid Rocket 
Booster and cause the vehicle to break up, resulting in the deaths of 
crew of 7 (Vaughan, 1996). 
Launch 
Launch & 
Propulsion 
9/6/ 
1988 
Soyuz TM-5 is stranded in orbit in the descent module for an extra 
day after an aborted deorbit due to sensor failure (Jane's Information 
Group, 2003). 
Space 
flight 
ADCS & 
GNC 
7/23/ 
1999 
STS-93 suffers premature main engine cutoff due to an electrical short 
and a hydrogen leak, resulting in a lower orbit than planned 
(Dismukes, 2005). 
Launch 
Launch & 
Propulsion 
2/1/ 
2003 
Space Shuttle Columbia breaks up on re-entry due to breach in 
leading edge of left wing where foam had impacted during lift-off, 
resulting in the deaths of crew of 7 (CAIB, 2003). 
Reentry TPS 
6/21/ 
2004 
SpaceShipOne Flight 15P encounters a roll during flight, and 
noncritical collapse of an aerodynamic fairing (Chandler, 2004). 
Launch 
ADCS & 
GNC 
9/29/ 
2004 
SpaceShipOne Flight 16P experiences rapid roll at Mach 2.7, causing 
flight control to recommend early engine shutdown (David, 2004). 
Launch 
ADCS & 
GNC 
4/19/ 
2008 
Soyuz TMA-11‘s service module does not completely separate from 
the reentry vehicle, causing a wrong-way-facing reentry and 420 km 
off-target landing (Eckel, 2008). 
Reentry 
Structure & 
Mechanisms 
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From this data, we are able to compile Figure 14 on the following page which illustrates this 
historical record graphically by mission phase (with labels denoting subsystem and year), and 
Table 9 which places incidents and accidents in a subsystem versus mission phase grid.  
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Soyuz 1 crash landing 
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STS-9 APU fires 
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Launch 
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STS-51-F main engine shutdown 
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Apollo 12 lightning strike 
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SpaceShipOne Flight 15P roll 
ADCS&GNC 2004 
X-15 Flight 191 breakup 
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ADCS&GNC 2004 
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Soyuz TMA-11 separation failure 
S&M 2008 
Voskhod 2 descent system failure 
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Soyuz 5 separation failure 
S&M 1969 
Space Shuttle Columbia breakup 
TPS 2003 
USA 
(blue) 
USSR/Russia 
(red) 
Commercial 
(green) 
Fatal Nonfatal 
Legend 
Figure 14: Incidents and accidents in human spaceflight by mission phase 
adapted and expanded from (Clark, 2007) 
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Table 9: Subsystems & mission phases, incidents & accidents, and criticality in HS 
 
 Mission phase   
Subsystem Prelaunch Launch 
Ballistic 
coast/ 
Spaceflight 
Reentry Landing Postlanding 
 
TOTAL 
Launch & Propulsion 1 3      4 
ADCS & GNC  3 3     6 
Structure & Mechanisms  1  4 1 2  8 
C&DH   1  1   2 
TT&C        0 
TCS        0 
Power  1   1   2 
ECLSS 1  1  1   3 
TPS    1    1 
         
TOTAL 2 8 5 5 4 2   
 
The evidence indicates certain ―hot spots‖: combinations of subsystems and mission 
phases where accidents and incidents are more likely to occur.  The pie charts in Figure 15 below 
show that just 2 subsystems (Structure and Mechanisms, ADCS & GNC) are responsible for 
54% of the instances, and with ECLSS and Launch & Propulsion added account for 80%.  In 
terms of mission phases, just Launch and Ballistic coast/Spaceflight make for 50% of accidents 
and incidents. 
 
Figure 15: Incidents and accidents in human spaceflight by percentages 
  
 Subsystems Mission phases 
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This data is important to note because probabilistic failure analysis informs CHS 
engineers about potential problems in the next flight, but government regulators must think in 
broader strokes about how decisions made now will have impact for years down the line.  This 
sort of long-term trends analysis is an important tool for policy-makers to have at their disposal. 
 
4.5 Mission safety criticality 
 
 This study of mission phases with their associated hazards, and subsystems with their 
responsibilities and potential failure modes, yields a matrix of which subsystems are most critical 
to mission success, and when.  While ideally each subsystem performs nominally in every stage 
of the mission, there are certain combinations of mission phase and subsystem failure that pose a 
heightened risk to the full system.  These are the nodes that should be targeted for regulation.   
 
Table 10 on the following page lists problems that may occur at certain junctions 
(Heydorn & Railsback, 2000), and illustrates levels of safety criticality (Pelton, Smith, Helm, 
MacDoran, Caughran, & Logsdon, 2005) on a three-tiered scale: Highly safety critical, 
Somewhat safety critical, and Less safety critical.  These distinctions should be understood to be 
relative to one another.  A subsystem-mission phase combination labeled ―less safety critical‖ is 
not immune to catastrophic failure, nor is a ―highly safety critical‖ node a guarantee of it.  Most 
aspects of HS are risky and have critical consequences of failure.  This delineation simply helps 
to sort, among risky items, which should receive more attention. 
 
This original analysis is not strictly quantitative.  It is based on the observations of HS 
mission history that we have just reviewed, literature about subsystem vulnerabilities, and 
discussions with space systems engineers.  It is primarily concerned with performance and safety 
issues that are more likely to exist in suborbital CHS.  
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Table 10: Subsystems, mission phases, and criticality 
 
 
  
 Mission phase 
Subsystem Prelaunch Launch 
Ballistic coast/ 
Spaceflight 
Reentry Landing Postlanding 
Launch & 
Propulsion 
Premature 
operation 
Fails to start 
Thrust anomaly 
Fails to stop 
Explosion 
  
Fails to start 
(when used 
in landing) 
Fails to stop 
(when used 
in landing) 
 
 
ADCS & 
GNC 
 
 
Premature 
operation 
 
   
Postlanding 
operation 
 
 
 
Structure & 
Mechanisms 
 
 
 
 
     
 
C&DH 
 
 
     
 
 
TT&C 
 
 
 
     
 
 
TCS 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
Power 
 
 
      
 
 
ECLSS 
 
 
 
     
 
TPS 
 
      
 Highly safety critical 
Legend: Less 
safety critical 
Somewhat 
safety critical 
Operational anomaly 
Inadvertent operation 
Drift/shift 
Axis alignment or bias anomaly 
Deployment anomaly 
Rubbing/fretting; Torque high/low 
Binding/jamming; Fails to extend/retract 
Fails mid-travel 
Inadvertent operation of pyros 
Structural failure 
System overload 
Erroneous output 
Antenna radiation pattern error/bandwidth anomaly 
Signal high/low 
Electrical signal-to-noise ratio low 
Waveform, bias, or incorrect frequency 
Internal/external leakage 
Flow anomaly 
Cavitation 
Loss of output 
Cavitation 
Internal/external leakage 
Flow anomaly 
Cabin pressure failure 
Thermal protection loss  
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Table 10 illustrates nodes of mission safety criticality for CHS.  There are 9 subsystems included 
and 6 mission phases, making for 54 combinations of the two.  Of these, 21 (39%) are deemed 
highly safety critical, 14 (26%) are labeled somewhat safety critical, and 19 (35%) are less safety 
critical.  The breakdown between these three tiers is illustrated in Figure 16. 
 
 
 
Figure 16: Safety criticality breakdown 
 
If these safety criticality delineations are accepted, it is clear that some risk factors are 
more pressing than others.  In Table 10, TT&C is less safety critical for the entire mission, while 
Structure & Mechanisms are highly safety critical for each moment following pre-launch.  
ADCS & GNC, Power, and ECLSS are highly safety critical for the majority of the mission, 
while C&DH and TCS are important but not of the utmost safety criticality for a suborbital 
trajectory.  Some of the subsystems are highly safety critical only at key moments, such as 
Launch & Propulsion during the beginning and end of the mission and TPS during reentry. 
 
The accident and incident data in Table 9 maps to the safety criticality model in Table 10 
to create Table 11 on the following page.  Seeing the two former tables combined in the latter, 
the historical data begins to justify the criticality delineations.  
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Table 11: Subsystems & mission phases, incidents & accidents, and criticality in HS 
 
 Mission phase 
Subsystem Prelaunch Launch 
Ballistic coast/ 
Spaceflight 
Reentry Landing Postlanding 
Launch & Propulsion 1 3     
ADCS & GNC  3 3    
Structure & Mechanisms  1  4 1 2 
C&DH   1  1  
TT&C       
TCS       
Power  1   1  
ECLSS 1  1  1  
TPS    1   
 
 
 
 
 
Each of the cells with more than one accident or incident is ―highly safety critical‖, while 
none of the ―less safety critical‖ cells has any mishaps.  The rest of the accidents and incidents, 
where there is only one instance in a cell, are spread between ―highly safety critical‖ and 
―somewhat safety critical‖.  There are also instances of cells of all three criticality levels with no 
accident or incident noted.  Those were assigned for a number of other reasons, from notes in the 
literature to discussions with space systems engineers. 
 
While not perfect, and certainly judgment-based enough to invite discussion, this model 
provides a solid starting point for CHS safety regulators.  Every government agency is resources-
constrained, and being able to target certain mission phase-subsystem nodes allows government 
agents to utilize their limited resources most effectively to protect safety.  Chapter 5 will 
conclude this discussion and propose conclusions aimed towards government regulators based on 
this work.  
 Highly safety critical 
Legend: Less 
safety critical 
Somewhat 
safety critical 
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
 The discussion to this point has touched on a wide variety of subjects that, taken together, 
will help us consider the most pertinent issues in government regulation and oversight for the 
protection of passenger safety in CHS.  Topics have ranged from regulatory theory, to risk and 
safety theory, to CHS-analogous industries, to the evolution of the FAA, CS, and CHS, to the 
history of space incidents and accidents, to a technical look at the intersection of spacecraft 
subsystems, mission phases, and safety criticality. 
 
 This chapter will synthesize these topics to provide analysis for industrial actor and 
government regulator alike.  From this discussion we will then draw conclusions and 
recommendations for the passenger safety regulation of CHS going forward.   
 
5.1 Summary 
 
We began by examining regulatory theory.  Congress, empowered by the Commerce 
Clause of the United States Constitution, primarily regulates industries by authorizing 
independent commissions to make rules and execute oversight on its behalf.  Because many 
industrial issues are highly technical, agency power is focused and deliberate.  An agency serves 
a variety of stakeholders, including the regulated industry itself, which generally attempts to gain 
competitive advantage through the process, potentially resulting in regulatory capture. 
 
Better rules are made when an agency is able to adapt to industrial changes and to 
balance the regulatory efficiency of centralized regulation with the industrial efficiency of 
customized regulations.  Regulations should be clear, easy to understand, long-sighted, and 
flexible.  Further, rules should be designed to not inherently pick winners.  Rule types include 
prior approval, mandatory standards, information disclosure, and economic instruments. 
 
 Self regulation can be an attractive option to government under certain conditions.  There 
must be a strong trade association, incentives for both government and industry to adopt this 
model, industry stability, and little anti-trust concern.  Activities include information disclosure, 
 
73 
product rating, conduct coding, creating safety standards, and guarding against deception from 
firms.  It is also regarded as effective in dealing with emerging technologies. 
 
 Risk and safety theory have also been central to this discussion.  Personal risk perception 
can be inaccurate, and hinges on what an individual knows, doesn‘t know, and which risk factors 
they don‘t even know to learn more about.  Though risk can be determined quantitatively, it must 
be put into context in order to have meaning to non-experts.  Society is generally much more 
tolerant of voluntarily-assumed risk than involuntarily-imposed risks.  Acceptable risk is the 
baseline amount of non-zero risk that is considered tolerable for carrying out an activity. 
 
Informed consent sets the acceptable risk for an individual: assuring that he or she knows 
of the risks involved and accepts them as part of the activity.  Uncertainty should also be 
explicitly spelt out, particularly with emerging technologies.  New technologies bring with them 
new and uncertain risks.  Regulatory decisions need to be made while often still lacking critical 
information or knowledge of long-term effects. 
 
Managing risk can be based on utility, rights, or technology.  Risk management in 
adventure activities should not stifle the activities altogether, but enough to protect both 
participants and operators.  While risk assessment cannot be completely separated from risk 
management, they should not compromise one another‘s purposes. 
 
 There are other industries that can serve as analogies for regulating CHS.  Adventure 
sports – specifically bungee jumping, hang gliding, and sky diving – are interesting because they 
are also high-risk recreational activities.  Commercial aviation is another industry of interest 
because of its common operational medium, early entrepreneurial spirit, public safety concerns, 
innovative technology for its time, and government oversight through the FAA. 
 
 CHS is a new application of HS and CS.  There are very few serious players as compared 
with almost any other emerging industry.  While the industry has promise, it has not yet 
delivered groundbreaking results or enjoyed much public acclaim since the X-Prize.  The 
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potential for success in the next several years, however, makes this an appropriate time to debate 
how passenger safety regulation going forward should be protected. 
 
Regulation of CHS is a prerogative of the US due to its international treaty 
obligations/liability and its imperative to protect public and citizen safety.  Protection of 
passenger safety for the CHS industry is primarily governed by the CSLAA and guided by the 
principle of informed consent.  Stricter regulation of design and operations by FAA/AST is due 
to be allowed in 2012, though that date was set when it was believed that the first commercial 
flights could begin as early as 2006 rather than the current forecast of 2010. 
 
Each CHS company utilizes a different technical design.  With a variety of body types, 
take-off/landing modes, and staging schemes, the differences across the board are as significant 
as are the similarities of mission and operational medium.  Spaceplanes seem to be an emerging 
popular option, though there is still little commonality among designs. 
 
A suborbital space mission can be delineated into six mission phases and nine 
subsystems.  The history of space incidents and accidents that are relevant to suborbital HS 
shows that these instances are more concentrated in some areas than others.  The combinations of 
subsystems and mission phases can thus be broken down roughly into three categories of mission 
safety criticality, the more critical of which should be subject to closer scrutiny by regulators. 
 
In this summary are drawn out the most important points of the previous four chapters.  
In the conclusions and recommendations section, we sill synthesize these disparate ideas into a 
few main messages.  
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5.2 Conclusions and recommendations 
 
5.2.1 Industrial analogies 
 
 CHS is not a ―normal‖ industry to be regulated by Congress and its regulatory agencies in 
a pre-prescribed, cookie-cutter fashion.  It has a set of characteristics that make it unique: a 
reliance on new and improved technologies, relatively very few serious firms, advanced enough 
notice of the industry‘s start that regulation before operational commencements is an option, no 
standardization of design and operation as of yet, and the potential for catastrophic damage to 
both uninvolved public and willing participants. 
 
It is similar to adventure sports as a high-risk recreational activity, where participant 
involvement is voluntary and undertaken with the knowledge of dangers inherent in the activity.  
Currently, the three adventure sports surveyed have a large degree of self regulation with 
government oversight, which may have been a result of the activities finding a need to protect 
participant safety before government involvement.  CHS can take eventual lessons in self 
regulation from these industries, but cannot afford to only regulate in response to laxity in safety. 
 
 Early commercial aviation poses another interesting analogy.  Both this industry and 
CHS operate (in part or in whole) in the national airspace.  Both have had/are having a 
―barnstorming‖ era, where drawing public interest was just as important as furthering 
technology, and both have benefitted from federal promotion.  In early aviation, standardization 
was initiated during wartime, while CHS will likely only standardize under government mandate 
or market forces coalescing around a superior design.  There were early calls for regulation from 
the industry and interest groups to bring governmental authority to bear in protecting safety.  The 
CHS industry seems more wary of early government regulation, though this may be due to 
differences in the regulatory environment between present day and the early-mid 20
th
 century. 
 
 There are other interesting analogies that each relate to some aspect of CHS, such as 
nuclear power with its relatively small number of players yet catastrophic potential.  The 
approach to CHS should begin with study of each of these analogies.  But truly, CHS is an 
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activity and industry all its own and too much reliance on other models may lead to a 
misunderstanding of the unique technical and regulatory challenges that CHS presents. 
 
Recommendations include: 
 Care must be taken when regulating CHS using lessons from other analogous industries. 
 Near-term CHS vehicles should be treated as suborbital spacecraft, not aircraft or orbital 
spacecraft.  They have unique technical challenges, and recycling regulations that were 
designed for other industries will miss critical points.  
 
5.2.2 Risk, safety, and society 
 
While it is possible to derive reliability measures for each component of a technical 
system, and extrapolate a statistical probability for the failure of the system as a whole from this, 
these numbers must be placed in social and historical context.  While most HS vehicles claim 
extremely small probabilities of failure, the fact remains that the historical chances of fatality 
during HS are larger than 1 in 70. 
 
CHS will attract both relatively informed ―space buff‖ and one-time thrill seeker, and no 
assumptions should be made as to what any of them knows before the flight.  Theoretical 
(including uncertainty) and historical data should be given to a SFP to help them assess their 
willingness to participate in light of that information.  Informed consent procedures should 
include enough information to make an educated choice, but not so much that a non-expert SFP 
will be overwhelmed with much more than the most necessary data.   
 
CHS is not a single-point failure industry, but neither can it afford many mistakes.  The 
industry‘s fortunes are directly tied to its safety record.  Safety should not be a competition 
between firms, as the industry cannot afford any safety ―losers‖.  When a tiremaker‘s tires blow 
out, consumers don‘t stop driving altogether, but rather just buy from a competitor.  Tires, 
however, are a necessity for people, whereas CHS is not.  One or two firms‘ failures can make 
potential SFPs reevaluate the activity as a whole and jeopardize the entire enterprise.  
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Recommendations include: 
 Informed consent continues to be required, with federally standardized areas of 
information disclosure that are understandable to non-experts. 
 Protocols are designed for both industry peers and government to deal with 
irresponsible actors. 
 
5.2.3 Regulatory approach 
 
 We have discussed self regulation and its advantages.  This model is useful for regulating 
emerging technologies because of its ability to gather and disseminate information effectively.  
Currently there is a trade organization in the Personal Spaceflight Federation, but it serves more 
to promote discussion than actually give orders with any sort of authority to the member firms. 
 
At this point, CHS does not need/is not yet ready for self regulation.  The industry is 
small enough that FAA/AST is able to collect the information it needs, and is not stable enough 
yet to initiate a self regulatory regime.  However, the statutory regulation regime being 
developed can seek to marry the specificity and efficiency of self regulation with the power of 
government-backed statutory regulation. 
 
Though this sort of system cannot last forever, FAA/AST should continue to regulate in a 
relatively ad-hoc, case-by-case manner for the time being.  This would be a wise application of 
the agency‘s technical expertise in instances of change and uncertainty.  By 2012, if not sooner 
due to serious incident or accident, they will have the authority to regulate design and operations 
across the board.  However, it is increasingly unlikely that there will be sufficient data by that 
time or that the industry will be remotely homogeneous enough to warrant this. 
 
Even if industry-wide regulation of design and operations to protect passenger safety is 
rolled in gradually, it is still likely to be instituted before the industry is fully mature.  There will 
still be major differences between companies‘ approaches, making across-the-board regulation 
difficult.  The three-tiered mission safety criticality model will prove useful as it can serve as a 
guide for where regulators should focus their energies.  Specific designation of a mission phase-
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subsystem node to a criticality level may change over time with technological advances and 
operational experience, but the principle behind the model remains. 
 
Recommendations include: 
 The 2012 start date for regulation of design and operations to protect passenger safety 
could be delayed, it could be replaced by an undated metric (i.e. number of companies in 
operation, number of flights taken, number of passengers flown, number of significant 
incidents, or frequency of flights), or FAA/AST could simply exercise good judgment in 
not creating more general rules until sufficient data is available 
 The rule types of prior approval and information disclosure to participants should 
continue to be used.  Economic instruments are not necessary yet.  Great care should be 
taken to avoid mandatory standards that cause technological lock-in of any design or 
operational practice until they are conclusively shown to be optimal. 
 FAA/AST should adopt a tiered mission safety criticality model that is general enough to 
help focus regulatory resources across the board but specific enough to regulate on an ad-
hoc, case-by-case basis as needed until statutory generalizations are appropriate. 
 
5.3 Future work 
 
 A good thesis raises more good questions than it answers.  While this discussion has 
completely delved into one specific area of inquiry with regards to CHS and government 
protection of passenger safety, this field is very new and ripe with interesting questions. 
 
Future academic work may consider developments in CHS, such as the technical 
achievement of orbital CHS and the policy implications of self regulation or regulatory capture.  
A deeper analysis of historical antecedents such as the X-15 and recycling of previous 
government efforts will also be useful, as the proverbial wheel is not likely to be reinvented with 
every entrant to the market. 
 
A comprehensive review of all CHS technical systems once that data becomes publically 
available will bring to the fore even more questions.  The framework offered here may be 
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insufficient to handle to diversity of CHS design and operational modes as more competitors 
enter the industry, and may need to be expanded. 
 
A few more interesting questions include how the insurance industry will approach 
creating policies for this high-risk venture with very little actuarial data available, and how FAA-
AST should deal with CHS operators based abroad who cater to US citizens.  There is an 
enormous niche to be filled by answering these questions and others, with this thesis just a first 
shot at tackling an extraordinarily complex set of questions. 
 
In a newly-emergent technical industry, changes occur rapidly.  Parts of this thesis may 
be irrelevant within even a few years as technological, economic, political, and regulatory 
circumstances change.  Hopefully this work will prove useful in the meantime.  
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Appendix A: Acronyms 
 
Acronym Phrase or name 
ADCS Attitude Determination and Control System 
C&DH Command and Data Handling 
CAA Civil Aeronautics Administration 
CAB Civil Aeronautics Board 
CHS Commercial Human Spaceflight 
CS Commercial Spaceflight 
CSLA Commercial Space Launch Act 
CSLAA Commercial Space Launch Amendments Act 
DOC Department of Commerce 
DOD Department of Defense 
DOT Department of Transportation 
ECLSS Environmental Control and Life Support System 
ELV Expendable Launch Vehicle 
FAA Federal Aviation Administration, né Federal Aviation Agency 
FAA/AST Federal Aviation Administration Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
FAR Federal Aviation Regulations 
GNC Guidance, Navigation, and Control 
HS Human Spaceflight 
HTHL Horizontal Takeoff, Horizontal Landing 
ICC Interstate Commerce Commission 
NACA National Advisory Committee for Aeronautics 
NASA National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NRC National Research Council 
OSC Office of Space Commercialization 
RLV Reusable Launch Vehicle 
SFP Spaceflight Participant 
SR Self Regulation 
TCS Thermal Control System 
TPS Thermal Protection System 
TT&C Telemetry, Tracking, and Command 
US United States 
US CPSC United States Consumer Product Safety Commission 
USPA United States Parachute Association 
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
VTHL Vertical Takeoff, Horizontal Landing 
VTVL Vertical Takeoff, Vertical Landing 
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Appendix B: COUHES documentation 
 
CONSENT TO PARTICIPATE IN INTERVIEW 
 
A Technoregulatory Analysis of Government Regulation and Oversight in the United States for the Protection 
of Passenger Safety in Commercial Human Spaceflight 
 
You have been asked to participate in a research study conducted by Misha Leybovich from Aerospace 
Engineering and the Technology & Policy Program at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (M.I.T.). The 
purpose of the study is to study government regulation of commercial human spaceflight by comparing that 
nascent industry with other, more established, high-risk recreational activities.  The results of this study will be 
included in Misha Leybovich‘s Masters thesis. You were selected as a possible participant in this study 
because you are a leader in one of the industries of interest for the study.  You should read the information 
below, and ask questions about anything you do not understand, before deciding whether or not to participate.  
 
• This interview is voluntary. You have the right not to answer any question, and to stop the interview at any 
time or for any reason. We expect that the interview will take about 30 minutes to 1 hour.  
 
• You will not be compensated for this interview. 
 
• Unless you give us permission to use your name, title, and / or quote you in any publications that may result 
from this research, the information you tell us will be confidential.  
 
• We would like to record this interview on audio cassette so that we can use it for reference while proceeding 
with this study. We will not record this interview without your permission. If you do grant permission for this 
conversation to be recorded on cassette, you have the right to revoke recording permission and/or end the 
interview at any time.  
 
This project will be completed by September 4, 2008.  All interview recordings will be stored in a secure work 
space until 1 year after that date. The tapes will then be destroyed.  
 
I understand the procedures described above. My questions have been answered to my satisfaction, and I agree 
to participate in this study. I have been given a copy of this form.  
 
(Please check all that apply)  
 
[] I give permission for this interview to be recorded on audio cassette.  
 
[] I give permission for the following information to be included in publications resulting from this study:  
 
[] my name   [] my title     [] direct quotes from this interview  
 
Name of Subject: _______________________________________                                                              
 
Signature of Subject: _____________________________________  Date: ____________    
                            
Signature of Investigator: __________________________________ Date: ____________ 
 
Please contact Misha Leybovich (mishaley@mit.edu, 617-324-2194) with any questions or concerns. 
 
If you feel you have been treated unfairly, or you have questions regarding your rights as a research subject, 
you may contact the Chairman of the Committee on the Use of Humans as Experimental Subjects, M.I.T., 
Room E25-143b, 77 Massachusetts Ave, Cambridge, MA 02139, phone 1-617-253-6787. 
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